

Solidarity Among Strangers: A Problem of Coexistence in Turkey

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I. Introduction

That the absence of democratic inclusion usually leads to the disruption of the social fabric and renders trust and peaceful coexistence increasingly difficult needs no argument. In the absence of comprehensive solidarity, coexistence is bought at the expense of a new regime of exclusion. In this paper, we discuss this as a problem of solidarity and illustrate our argument with reference to the Kurdish issue in Turkey. We find it fruitful to approach the Kurdish issue from the perspective of solidarity especially at a time when an Islamic model of social integration presents itself as an alternative to genuine democratic inclusion.

Turkey left behind one of the most difficult summers of its history as the Constitutional Court was seeking to close down its ruling party, which received 47% of the votes in the 2007 general elections. When the case of closing the AKP (the Justice and Development Party) came to the Court, and the Court's decision to not close it down generated sighs of relief. Some commentators such as Andrew Arato saw in the decision of the Court a refashioning of its role in Turkey's political life, i.e., its search for elevating itself to the role of initiating deliberation and consensus-seeking among the conflicting parties (as the European Constitutional Courts have traditionally been doing). During the same time frame, there was another case to close down the DTP (the Democratic Society Party), the last Kurdish party to come into being after its successors were systematically closed down by the Court. This second court case remains unnoticed and the DTP's very possible closure does not seem to stir anything that comes close to the storms that were unleashed by the possibility of the AKP's closure. While this selective treatment of party closure cases definitely requires attention, the context in which the closure of the DTP is being sought deserves special attention. Until the 2007 election, the DTP used to earn the votes of an overwhelming majority of Kurds who reside in the southeastern region of Anatolia. Due to the carefully planned, tremendously expensive and sustained campaign by the AKP, for the first time in Turkish history, a Kurdish party faced a serious challenge in getting the votes of Kurds in the region for the first time in the recent history of Turkey.

Currently, the Islamic solidarity model is portraying itself as the only viable option for a peaceful resolution to ethnic conflict within Turkey. If Turkishness and Kurdishness create problems of integration, then being Sunni Muslims would be the grounds for membership, as the reasoning goes. As more and more disillusioned Kurds become eager to be co-opted by the Sunni-based Islamic solidarity, the more likely it is for Islamic solidarity to consolidate itself as a model of social cohesion, not merely for southeastern Anatolia where a majority of Kurdish citizens reside, but also for Turkey as a whole. While such a shift from ethnicity-based political representation to an all-embracing, catch-all type representation could be seen as a welcome development especially in its potential to end a long lasting ethnic conflict, the reasons for the shift, the assumption of an encompassing Sunni Islamic identity it relies on, and the outcomes it is likely to generate should also be investigated.

This article attempts to develop a theoretical framework in which such an investigation could be situated by critically engaging with the literature on solidarity. We believe that a critical appraisal of this literature would provide an analytical basis on which the Kurdish issue in Turkey could be discussed in its different dimensions. At the same time, the empirical case in question provides a rich example to illustrate the analytical potential of the notion of solidarity that we aim to highlight in a theoretical discussion.

The literature on solidarity reflects a recent resurgence of interest in the concept.¹ As this literature reveals, solidarity is a complex and nebulous concept with multiple meanings. While it is at times discussed as a sentiment, akin to love, friendship or altruism, it might also designate institutional practices often associated with redistributive arrangements that characterize welfare states. Solidarities forged around group interests, such as “class solidarity,” are often taken as paradigmatic. Or solidarity may refer to a sort of bond that holds together a complex society differentiated by a structure of divergent interests. Mutual trust among people who share a common institutional context might define a solidaristic society, but the existence of solidarity could also be attributed to ascriptive identities or myths of common descent. The unit of analysis of solidarity could be the nation-state or ethnic/religious communities, but at the former level too, ascriptive identity rather than the institutional fabric could be seen as playing the key role in maintaining social cohesion. In our globalized world order, debates around peaceful coexistence sometimes extend beyond national boundaries and bring to the fore the conditions for international solidarity. Interpreted in many different ways and taking on multiple forms, solidarity nevertheless remains the primary substance of any and every society. It never disappears, but only changes form. Whereas there have been many societies without equality and liberty, it is virtually impossible to find or even conceive of one without any form of solidarity. Hierarchical societies of both past and present, ranging from Ancient Greek city-states to the aristocracies in Europe, from the caste system in India to some contemporary Muslim communities where exclusion of women is still prevalent, are examples of societies which exclude equal freedoms but still contain solidarities in one form or another. Friendship of equals, fraternities, Christian or Muslim brotherhoods, tribal solidarities based on blood and kinship are some examples of the variety that solidarity can display even in societies where liberty and/or equality are absent. Every society contains some form of solidarity that holds it together.

What, then, is the form of solidarity that could coexist with equality and liberty, one that would go along with equal freedoms for all in a democratic society? To answer this question, one needs, first, to distinguish between two kinds of solidarity: “solidarity among strangers,” which we will designate with capital S, and other forms of solidarity informed by group interest or ascriptive identity, designated by small s. While both kinds of solidarity refer to a sense of belonging, feeling of togetherness and cooperation, the former has a normative priority over the latter. This is because S, without precluding the existence of in-group solidarities, provides an inclusive framework that makes inter-group solidarity among strangers possible.

As we understand it, S is a triangulated concept of solidarity that involves both liberty and equality. Triangulation necessarily defines a new bond that is forged among strangers and denotes a complex society that is marked by internal diversity. Feelings of solidarity in this sense, in contrast to solidarities based on sameness or familiarity, are created and sustained by institutional arrangements that include the basic indivisible, individual, civil, political, socioeconomic, and cultural rights of each member of the political community in

conjunction with equality before the law, the rule of law, and democratic participation. T. H. Marshall's classic work, which theorizes citizenship in terms of a historically expansive set of rights that create an equality of status, can be seen as laying the foundation of an inclusive solidarity in a complex society even though Marshall does not talk about the relationship between citizenship and solidarity explicitly.² The two are however closely related since equality in status will naturally contribute towards a more cohesive society.³

We must underline that S cannot be viewed as the outcome of an evolutionary process whereby "archaic" forms of solidarity give way to a modern one, firmly established in its integrity only to be challenged by exogenous factors. Neither does the small s, informed by shared ascriptive characteristics, correspond to ever present social realities that are taken as given. It is rather the political failures to acknowledge and meet the demands for individual rights that lead to a situation where S breaks down into solidarities based on sameness. This amounts to the fragmentation of the political community whereby the articulation and pursuit of demands undergoes a paradigmatic shift in that unfulfilled demands for individual rights accumulate in the form of community demands for group rights and often give rise to a politics of difference and multiculturalism. Under these circumstances the meanings of freedom and equality cannot remain the same. Freedom begins to denote not individual but cultural freedom, and equality signifies the equality of cultures. Neither freedom nor equality refers to individuals' status anymore.

Given that equality, liberty, and solidarity get transformed and change their meanings when they are separated from the whole, it is plausible to suggest that the triangulated solidarity is a *holistic* notion. The cumulative normative value attained with triangulation diminishes whenever elements are no longer triangulated. Stated differently, equality, liberty, and solidarity attain a superior normative value when these are co-institutionalized and co-fertilized. Triangulated solidarity immediately implies the equality and the equal liberty-bearing character of its members who have been incorporated into the political association on equal and fair terms. In the terrain thus generated, equal freedoms refer to rights-bearing individuals who share a common sense of belonging sustained through their continued trust in one another. A society without individual liberties or without equality might still be a solidaristic society, but it will not be a society whose members are bound by S.

We will be highlighting, then, the holistic character of S whose negation or sheer absence implies a *political* failure on the part of the society to integrate all of its members on the basis of their equal freedoms. It is at this point that ascriptive forms of familiarity or a multiplicity of monocultures⁴ could proliferate or even become dominant. And, with their sectarianism, moral and cultural relativism and in-group as opposed to inter-group solidarity further erode the ideals and institutions on which equal freedoms and democratic inclusion should ideally rest. Rather than being the last station of an evolutionary or revolutionary history then, modern solidarity among strangers needs to be constantly reaffirmed and sustained *as a political project* in order to prevent the emergence of a regressive dialectics and to prepare the ground for the inception of a progressive dialectics.

In this context timing is of the utmost importance. If the demands for democratic inclusion voiced by those who are disadvantaged, marginalized, suppressed, non- or mis-recognized or simply disillusioned are not met by trust-generating policies and institutions at the right time and in the right way, they often quickly change form. Demands that initially call for equal respect and status could turn into demands for group rights and privileges, and sometimes even demands for autonomy or complete secession.

The discussion we present in this article is informed by the international environment of neoliberal globalization, the increasing inability of the nation-state to implement policies that maintain social cohesion, and the rise of multiculturalism. It is not, however, our intention to discuss the socially disruptive potential of neoliberalism or to specify the shortcomings and the normative fallacies of multicultural politics. Instead, with reference to the case of Turkey, we will draw attention to the relationships between neoliberalism and multiculturalism only to argue that multicultural politics does not emerge as a result of intensified democratization as is sometimes argued, but constitutes a response to the absence, failure, and/or fragmentation of an inclusive project of S.

In this article we refer to the nation-state as the entity that gives content to individual rights and defines the terms of citizenship. The boundaries of the political *vis-à-vis* citizenship might in fact shift in a supranational entity such as the European Union, and this informs the solidarity debate in Europe.⁵ Yet, institutions and policies that are necessary to validate equal liberties of individuals who live in a complex democratic society continue to require *some* form of territorially bounded political authority. Turkey is not an exception.

Engaging with the literature on solidarity, this article develops these theses within the context of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. We will argue that both the Islamic solidarity model and the Kurdish nationalism that has arisen as a response to the ethno-nationalist policies of the Turkish state represent s. In the last section we will refer to the increasingly dim political prospect of a triangulated concept of S within Turkey as a junction that is being shaped by the regressive dialectics that is set off by ascriptive solidarities and their increasingly intertwined politics.

II. Solidarity Among Strangers Versus Other forms of Solidarity

After Emile Durkheim introduced the distinction between what he called “mechanical solidarity” and “organic solidarity,” the term “solidarity,” for a long time, ceased to rouse any academic interest.⁶ Solidarity went underground, as it were, and was frequently employed at first by labor and afterwards by all types of new social movements. In the past decade or so, studies on solidarity in a wider sense began to emerge from the shadows.⁷ A strand within solidarity studies convincingly argues that the modern concept of solidarity is the result of the French Revolution. The modern concept refers to a solidarity among strangers who are taken to be free and equal members of a political community despite their unfamiliar traits, mostly non-identical descent, plurality of preferences, and variety of their choices. According to Brunkhorst, this modern rendering of solidarity developed essentially out of two sources: first, a not entirely egalitarian notion of civic friendship, and second, a more universal idea of brotherliness in the Judeo-Christian tradition:

... in the Western revolutions of 1776, 1789, and 1848, the Christian ethic of brotherliness was politicized, and republican civil solidarity was egalitarianized. . . . Conversely, by connecting with the compassionate ethic of brotherliness, the meaning of equal civic freedom shifted away from elitist particularism toward egalitarian universalism.⁸

In a complex society, the addressees of the political regime are unfamiliar – in ascriptive terms – with relation to one another. A solidarity that is to be forged among strangers dethrones the supposed legitimacy of the idea of common descent. Unlike ascriptive and familial ties which people inherit, such as ethnic belonging, religious affiliation, racial or communal identity, solidarity of those who grant equal freedoms to one another is based

on common emancipatory interests⁹ and universalistic ideas and institutions¹⁰ rather than on the “authority of the past.” This means imagining a new type of society, one that is to be remade by selectively appropriating and thereby transforming the inheritance of the past, instead of one which is to be cherished and perpetuated due to the supposed glory of its past. This understanding is closely related to the idea of citizenship in a secular legal community where solidarity is no longer characterized by “forced willingness to sacrifice oneself for a collective system of self assertion that is always present in premodern forms of solidarity.”¹¹

Pre-modern forms of solidarity – which Helmut Ritter, who was writing in Istanbul in exile at that time, called “irrational solidarity”¹² (with the example of its very modern manifestation in Nazi Germany unmistakably in his mind) – are based on shared identity and common historical descent. While solidarity among strangers prioritizes equal membership in a political community over ascriptive identities and thus refers to forging new bonds among strangers, this inclusive regime could nevertheless let other types of solidarities coexist along with the overarching citizenship identity. Yet what Ritter called “irrational” solidarities were bent on reinventing ascriptive ties and rekindling old affinities to unite people on the basis of their sameness. Unlike the inclusive citizenship regime characterized by the idea of solidarity among strangers, solidarities that have a claim to unite those who share a common descent and ascriptive ties are essentially and often outspokenly exclusivist in character. The subversion of the modern citizenship ideal by nationalism that informs Ritter’s article is distinguished by a hostility towards diversity and essentially sets itself against the idea of forging bonds with, and establishing political equality among, strangers. What is subverted here are the terms of coexistence in a complex society, where multiple solidarities in kinship groups, ethnic and religious communities, or diverse associations continue to exist and do not necessarily conflict with modern citizenship as a unifying bond.¹³

Observing the compatibility of such inter- *and* intra-group diversity with modern solidarity among strangers is not the same, however, as a tendency to celebrate inter-group not intra-group. Intra-group diversity is needed for democracy. Its relative depoliticization makes it increasingly difficult to assert the normative priority of the citizenship ideal over different forms of belonging and impairs the possibility of politically articulating the tensions that might exist between different types of solidarities. This tendency emerges in the present historical juncture characterized by a widespread loss of faith in the ability of the nation-state to unite divergent interests that characterize a modern society around the ideal of equal citizenship. As Zygmunt Baumann sums up eloquently,

Since the idea that the ‘society’ institutionalized in the state will lend a helping hand no longer holds much water, no wonder that eyes shift in a different direction; by some irony of history, however, they drift towards entities whose radical destruction used to be seen, from the beginning of modernity, as the condition sine qua non of ‘meaningful choice’: it is now the much-maligned ‘natural communities of origin’, necessarily *smaller than the nation-state*, once described by modernizing propaganda as parochial backwaters, prejudice-ridden, oppressive and stultifying, which are looked to hopefully as the trusty executors of human choices which the nation-state abominably failed to bring forth.¹⁴

Hence, one observes in some of the contemporary literature that solidarities as sentiment or practice, as generalized or group specific, as institutionalized, or as merely culturally informed, are mentioned side by side on a par with each other, without any concern for a normative ordering or any acknowledgement of possible tensions among them. Thus,

Outhwaite speaks of societies, markets, and people as all needing solidarity and writes that,

The variable geometry of solidarity may in fact be a virtue, in that it can be used to bridge the gap between sentiment and action, specificity or diffuseness . . . the variable geography of the concept fits a reality in which the scope of and bearers of solidaristic sentiments and practices are increasingly diverse and unpredictable¹⁵

Although such an approach is in conformity with the aura of multiculturalism, where the proliferation of solidarities based on sameness is regarded as a sign of democracy, it fails to address a series of important questions that pertain to the implications of this particular type of diversity for solidarity among strangers. Multicultural policies aimed at respecting, protecting or promoting inter-group diversity attribute a novel political significance to *s* which might present a challenge to the institutions and attitudes that sustain the inclusive character of *S* wherever it is historically given, and obstruct the emergence of an inclusive *S* where democratic inclusion has never been a reality.

This problem is clearly manifested in the realm of economic redistribution where solidaristic action takes on a form different from altruism or charity in that it is mandated and enforced by the state, although it still needs to be accepted by taxpayers who assume the burden of providing income and security to those who are in need. How the multiplicity of the monocultural solidarities might undermine this type of redistributive solidarity is extensively discussed in the literature. The tensions between ascriptive group solidarity and more inclusive economic redistribution (whose benefits after all accrue to perfect strangers) appear as the outcome of a series of mechanisms which might render the agreement around a common sense of justice impossible.¹⁶ These tensions make it difficult for particularly disadvantaged groups to make their problems and demands known and raise doubts about the legitimacy of the claims these groups have on common resources.¹⁷

In these discussions on sameness or familiarity based *s*, we find a clear example of how the shared sense of justice and solidarity that the redistributive politics rely on can be challenged. The satisfaction of economic needs of the disadvantaged and their right to be recognized as equal members can either remain unmet, be transferred to voluntary and fickle benevolence, or left to be satisfied through the culturally informed practices within the closed community. Even where the basic requirements can be satisfied through informal arrangements, two rather significant sets of problems remain. First, the subordination of the individual to group pressure is enhanced in cases where community membership forms the basis for the satisfaction of individual needs, and the principle of equal freedom of all is seriously challenged in all cases where charity replaces formal right-based state transfers. Second, the replacement of formal social rights by informally distributed grants and financial assistance that accrue to individuals and families through membership in ethnic or religious communities contains the risk of distributing social services and benefits in an arbitrary and unequal manner given that the resources commanded by different solidarity groups are bound to be unequal. In the case of particularly disadvantaged groups, such arbitrary and informal arrangements would necessarily exacerbate existing inequalities among the members of the wider society and widen the gap among communities.

The inevitable escalation of inter-group inequality through the proliferation of *s* is almost always caused by an undermined, failed, and/or delegitimated and depoliticized *S*. This outcome can be characterized as a *pairing* of (sameness or familiarity based) solidarity,

either with individual liberty or with the relevant culture's freedom, leaving out equality in both cases. Yet the triangulation that defines the holistic character of solidarity among strangers cannot simply be substituted by such a pairing. The pairing of individual liberty with solidarity is exemplified by Wagner in a neo-Tocquevillian¹⁸ perspective, as "a specific form of associative relation that permits the combination of personal liberty and democracy."¹⁹ On the other hand, Barry provides the normative fallacies of pairing cultural freedom with solidarity.²⁰ S is genuine solidarity only when it is triangulated with equal freedoms of each and every member of that society. The strategy of pairing rather than the triangulation of equality, liberty and solidarity, another tendency in solidarity studies consists of identifying solidarity with economic redistribution.²¹ Yet again, the holistic concept of solidarity is all about a "surplus validity," to borrow a term that Axel Honneth employs in a different context.²² Tightly attached to *both* liberty and politics, as well as socioeconomic equality, and in having been constituted and borne by the historically generated ideas and institutional practices of the rule of law and democratic participation – and the *indivisibility* of basic civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights – solidarity is certainly related with but cannot be reduced to economic redistribution. While solidarity cannot be said to exist without social and economic rights that should complement other rights, it cannot simply be equated to the existence of social rights, nor can it be seen as the outcome of merely the latter. After all, we can think of political contexts that grant social rights without recognizing political equality or equal liberties of all their members; alternately, we can conceive of contexts that would entail recognition of equal civil and political status without the recognition of social rights.

T. H. Marshall, however, argued that civil, political, and social rights follow and complement each other in a way to form the inseparable constituents of equal status. If Marshall is right about the implications of recognizing equal status, then we cannot simply unlearn what has been historically generated in order to arrive at an indivisible set of rights. We simply cannot "unlearn" in the sense of discarding the normative superiority of equal status. But counterrevolution and regressive dialectics might well be within the spectrum of possibility if the triangulated notion of solidarity ceases to be a political project.

These are important concerns that highlight the implications of overlooking the normative significance of S and the tensions between it and the pluralized solidarities designated by s. However, these concerns do not fully capture either the nature of the political dynamics through which such tensions emerge or the extent of their consequences on the moral fabric of the society. The next section aims to take a closer look at the political dynamics that are involved here.

III. Regressive Dialectics of Undermined Solidarity and Solidarity as a Political Project

The impact of the "pluralization of solidarities" on the politics and maintenance of economic redistribution often relies on a unidirectional assessment of cause and effect. One begins with an existing structure of modern solidarity in its inclusive character and proceeds to investigate the *exogenous* challenges to societies that have achieved such an inclusive environment through, in particular, welfare state arrangements.²³ Van Parijs et al., for example, investigate whether the expansion of cultural diversity through immigration impairs economic solidarity. Although their findings are mixed, the commentators and researchers involved underline that most probably there would be a time when cultural diversity would lead to the dismantling of the existing welfare regimes in Europe. The exogeneity attributed to cultural identity and

group interest as the basis of different types of solidarities might in fact be problematic since the forms of inter-group diversity that manifest themselves as a plurality of solidarities and challenge the solidarity among strangers might actually *result from* a political failure that hinders the inclusive character of the society under consideration. The proliferation of ascriptive solidarities may well be, and in fact often is, *endogenous* to the failures of the existing solidarity regime. In other words, people who belong to different identity or interest groups might, at a particular historical juncture, begin to prioritize their ascriptive identity *over* the social bond defined in terms of inclusive democratic citizenship. Narrower but always readily available, *s* trumps the idea of *S*, not necessarily because people conceive of *s* as an alternative to an already established *S*, but most likely because *S* is not available or failed and became delegitimized within that context.

The rise of multicultural politics takes place at such a historical juncture, where the nation-state is challenged, in particular, by the advent of neoliberal globalization where unchecked international mobility of capital and the worldwide reach of unregulated markets abound. What lies beyond the nation-state is not necessarily a democratic form of cosmopolitan citizenship as a more inclusive foundation for social integration. As Seyla Benhabib points out:

...the transcendence of the nation-state is occurring hardly in the direction of cosmopolitanism but more in the direction of the privatization and corporatization of sovereignty. These trends endanger democracy and popular sovereignty by converting public power into private commercial and administrative competence. Democracies' abilities to regulate the actions that are taken in their name are increasingly weakened.²⁴

The trends that Benhabib is referring to are clearly situated in the current neoliberal order. As neoliberalism attacks the idea of social rights and the welfare state, citizens begin to seek assistance from within the groups that they are most familiar with. The ensuing politics is multicultural and identity-based, yet the extent to which multiculturalism is a vital sign of democratization and the extent to which it is the very outcome of de-democratization effected by neoliberalism is open to debate.

Moreover, it should be noted that the challenge to the nation-state was also ideological. As faith in unregulated market mechanisms became stronger, state intervention did not only become difficult to sustain but also began to be seen as undesirable and even harmful. An increasingly intense questioning of welfare state policies accompanied attempts to relegate social protection either to the market or to voluntary benevolence. Where markets clearly failed to assure social cohesion through contractual relations, families, religious and ethnic communities, or voluntary initiatives were called upon to provide the needed security to the individual. Philanthropy has acquired a novel significance along with ascriptive identities as sources of security and shelter in an increasingly insecure socioeconomic order.²⁵

As economic liberalism heightens its normative and empirical validity in a social context, so do philanthropy and charity. While neoliberalism undermines social equality and generates accelerated levels of social inequality, the resulting social costs are "naturally" delegated to the sphere of civil society initiatives. On the other hand, a purely economically conceived solidarity, especially if it also arbitrarily excludes a number of potential beneficiaries or "strangers," is bound to be *less than* a solidarity that is based on equal freedoms for all; it fails to generate democratic inclusion. While small *s* initiatives and "community empowerment projects" are presumed to act as the surrogate social state, these inevitably fail to produce the normative as well as the empirical outcomes that would be generated through inclusive and

rights-based entitlements. As Benhabib writes with reference to the problems of integration of immigrants in Europe,

In the current context, it is desirable to find a language of universalistic solidarity, which also would be a language of integration through socioeconomic equality rather than that of assimilation through denial of difference. Redistribution and recognition struggles need to go hand in hand.²⁶

The failure of the existing basic rights regime to respond to the demands for democratic inclusion and social equality renders it increasingly conceivable for the excluded groups to retreat to solidarities that are based on sameness or familiarity. When minorities regularly experience that they are not treated and recognized as equal members of that society, when they are subjected to cultural misrecognition, social exclusion or marginalization, or when their basic rights are simply denied, the very idea of equal freedoms as it pertains to that *society* are undermined. In other words, recognitional injustice does not simply diminish the equal status rights of that particular group, it obliterates the very idea of political equality within that society. Not only does solidarity, which might have been a fact in the past for that society, no longer apply, but because the social structure now falls short of what triangulation requires, the whole structure of solidarity also collapses. While the injustice of misrecognition renders it impossible to refer to equal freedoms in that society, given the unavailability of inter-group solidarity to remedy the injustice, the solidarity of the excluded group takes the form of a solidarity based on familiarity.

While misrecognition of immigrant or native minority populations and their social and political exclusion from the equal membership regime may have been the essential problems within a given society, if the lack of possibility for forging inter-group solidarities persists, the excluded groups would inevitably opt for a communitarian resistance. Yet the attempt to instill cultural recognition through intra-group solidarity only helps to perpetuate the excluded groups' isolation, while economic liberalism also goes unchallenged through cultural segmentation. Pateman has identified a version of this problem as it occurs in women's movements and called it "Wollstonecraft's dilemma."²⁷ The excluded group wants equal status as much as it requires the recognition of its own group's difference. In a patriarchal context, equal citizenship may entail incorporation of women as "lesser men," while recognition of women as an essentially different group results in reproducing their exclusion from full citizenship. Women can neither give up the first nor the second, while simultaneous existence of both demands and strategies chip away at each other. The same type of dilemma, we argue, applies to the recognition demands of immigrants in Europe and ethnic and national minorities elsewhere, for example in Turkey. Neither the demand for equal status nor the demand for the recognition of difference can be surrendered. The strategy that furthers claims for equal status chips away at the goal of the recognition of cultural difference and *vice versa*.

Unlike strong strands in women's movements, which have consistently sought equal status, we are talking about a context in which the strategy of making cultural difference recognized often predominates over the strategy of acquiring equal status. In this context, instead of a transformative/deconstructive alternative,²⁸ which could modify the very concept of citizenship for everyone, a *regressive* dialectics sets in, which redefines membership based on familiarity.

To recapitulate, it seems difficult to interpret the modern notion of solidarity as the last station of an evolutionary and revolutionary history.²⁹ Starting with Durkheim, those who

studied solidarity showed the progressively unfolding and evolutionary character as well as the revolutionary moment of what they saw as a genuinely modern concept. Brunkhorst's recent study on solidarity also remains loyal to this tradition and treats solidarity as a thoroughly modern concept, but one which has been replenished through, and has selectively employed the achievements of, its forerunners (*philia, caritas, fraternité*). While neither the ideal of liberty nor fraternity were new, their triangulation with the revolutionary idea of equality produced a new sense of equal freedoms that was not conceivable when liberty meant merely the privilege of the privileged and fraternity meant the mutual support that members of a closed community of brothers afforded to one another. Once the revolutionized idea of a triangulated notion of solidarity had been achieved through the French Revolution, it quickly spread to all parts of the world and it is still expanding its sphere of influence. This remarkable achievement seems inevitable, unstoppable, and irreversible to Brunkhorst and others who focus on the progressive character of the modern notion of solidarity. This traditional interpretation of solidarity as "firm, dense and solid"³⁰ and as the achievement of modern democracy captures only half of the picture in theory while also necessarily remaining insufficient to explain the unfolding reality today. Also, refragmentation and counterrevolutionary resolidification are always integral to the potential of solidarity. Since the need for solidarity never ceases to be, whenever S is either institutionally absent or unavailable as a political project, a politics of s is generated to result in greater and greater fragmentation of already narrow solidarity alternatives. The Kurdish issue in Turkey and the mutually supportive relationship it found in the Islamic notion of solidarity engendered by the leadership of AKP and the funds provided by faith-based initiatives are perfect examples of the probable outcomes that are likely to occur when the regressive dialectic is set off.

IV. The Kurdish Issue as a Problem of Solidarity

The Turkish Republic was founded against the historical background of a multi-ethnic empire. Until the nineteenth century ethnic diversity was managed within the Ottoman *millet* system, which accorded a large degree of autonomy to different communities. In this context, neither the ethnic identity of Kurds nor the specificity of the socioeconomic relations and the political structure that are prevalent in the region – i.e., the tribal hierarchies and the authority of religious leaders – were contested. In the final years of the Empire and through the formation of the Republic, Kurds allied themselves with the Turks against the foreign invaders and against those who were perceived to be collaborating with the invaders. However, relations of trust between the Ankara government and the Kurdish elites rapidly came to an end, and the first Kurdish uprising of the Republican period led by a religious leader, Shaikh Said, took place in 1924. In the historical accounts of this uprising, special emphasis is placed on the abolition of the Caliphate, which the Kurds regarded as the main bond between the two populations that were thus far unified by their common Islamic identity. The abolition of the Caliphate might have both reinforced the already emerging doubts of the Kurdish notables about the attitude of the Ankara government toward the preservation of the existing social order specific to the region and provided a basis for contesting the legitimacy of the central state.³¹

The Shaikh Said rebellion and a series of other insurgencies in the early decades of the Republic were severely repressed by the government. It was clear that the form of solidarity peculiar to the Ottoman *millet* system was no longer there, and despite declarations that claimed otherwise, it was not replaced by an inclusive framework that could make inter-group solidarity among strangers possible. The terms of citizenship in the new Republic were

defined in such a way that in spite of the references to membership in the political community, Muslim identity remained an important feature of what is understood by “Turkishness.”³² Theoretically, this did not present any problem for the integration of Kurds as full citizens of the Republic. Yet, the acceptance of Kurds as full citizens remained contingent upon the denial of their ethnic identity and their linguistic difference in particular. The use of Kurdish language was forcefully repressed and systematic attempts were made to ethnically assimilate the Kurdish population through mass education campaigns that, incidentally, turned out to be highly unsuccessful. Kurdish individuals were denied, in other words, the right to use their mother tongue, let alone to develop it through cultural activities.

The solidarity that the Republican state attempted to forge was primarily based on the denial of cultural rights for Kurdish individuals, which was translated into the realm of politics and political rights when, in the later years of the Republic, any national political movement attempting to articulate the Kurdish demands faced severe repression.³³ Political participation of the Kurdish population could only be realized through local notables allied with one of the national parties within the political establishment. While it was possible for Kurds to hold important positions in the political arena, as in economic and social life in general, this non-discrimination appeared in a setting that excluded any transformative strategy whereby the terms of co-existence of Kurdish and Turkish citizens could be reconstructed on the basis of the recognition of difference. The idea of “Turkishness” defined by the central state formed the basis on which the content of individual civil and political rights were determined and were not allowed to be questioned either by Kurds or Turks.

The socioeconomic backwardness of the Eastern and South Eastern regions where Kurds constituted the majority of the population long attracted the attention of government authorities, who often attributed it to the nature of social relations prevailing in the area.³⁴ There was, however, no serious attempt to transform these relations by the empowerment of people through social rights that could be used on the basis of mutual trust between the population and the state. Political authorities relied, instead, on the compliance of local notables to contain popular dissatisfaction.³⁵

It was against this historical background set by the absence of a political project to realize democratic inclusion based on equality and freedom that the formation of the PKK (the Labor Party of Kurdistan) as a popular leftist organization took place in the 1970s. Unlike the preceding Kurdish insurgencies that were predominantly feudal, elitist, religious and based on the support of mainly the middle classes, the PKK was outspoken about its stance against feudalism, was not elitist in character and its main base was the lower income groups.³⁶ The formation of an independent Kurdish state, including the Kurdish regions of Iran, Iraq and Syria, was part of the party’s program. The failure to establish an inclusive framework of solidarity among equal and free citizens sharing a political space shaped by the recognition of difference had given way to the politicization of cultural difference in a separatist movement.

Extremely severe political repression that made life unbearable for all individuals in the Kurdish region after the military intervention of 1980 was followed by the escalation of armed conflict between state forces and the PKK, starting in the mid-1980s. Violence had become an integral part of the daily life in the region, which did not fail to translate into the curbing of democratic rights and the freedom of expression in the rest of the country or for the whole population. The authoritarianism that was unleashed by the military coup (1980) continued to reign over the citizens of Turkey, especially with regard to the Kurdish issue long after the authoritarian regulations, which had a negative impact on other political discussions, ceased to be important. The Kurdish issue, along with the security-military character that

is attributed to its resolution, still remains untouchable in so many respects. The diversity and even polarization within the popular media which characterizes the coverage of secular-Islamist confrontation comes to an end whenever the issue is related to Kurds or to the region that is heavily populated by the Kurds.

According to commentators who are familiar with the Kurdish issue, 1999 signifies a moment of missed opportunity for Turkey.³⁷ In 1999, when the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, was captured in Kenya, brought to trial and sentenced to life imprisonment, a new period seemed to begin, initially with hopes for an enduring peace that were shared by Turks and Kurds alike. Following the directions of their leader in prison, PKK militants declared a ceasefire. And as a gesture of “good will,” a selected group among the PKK militants surrendered to the security forces. The organization entered a new phase of reappraisal and restructuring, with those opting for a non-violent strategy of integration in Turkish society acquiring an increasingly strong position. This strategy was clearly articulated by the leadership in 2003.³⁸ It was matched by some signals of change in the state’s Kurdish policy and, for a brief period of time, a form of solidarity based not on sameness but one that was triangulated with equality and liberty of rights bearing individuals appeared as a possibility for the country.

Nevertheless, the political determination and will to respond to the demands of those who had been disadvantaged by non-recognition, political repression, and socioeconomic exclusion through trust-generating policies and institutions was too weak and not entirely genuine. The crucial significance of timing for the realization of a rare opportunity to bring all parties to accept the terms of a peaceful coexistence based on equal status was not appreciated, perhaps due to the euphoria caused by the capture of Öcalan. Soon different domestic and international concerns of the ruling government began to set new obstacles to a lasting political solution. As the expectations of a rapidly enacted amnesty law that could have fostered trust and confidence of the PKK militants willing to opt for democratic integration in society were disappointed, it seems that these militants, too, have begun to reconsider their 1999 decision to put an end to acts of violence.³⁹ By 2005, the dynamics of the regressive dialectics of a never fully realized and repeatedly undermined solidarity among strangers had already begun to erode trust and contribute to the rise of ethnic nationalism among both the Kurdish and the Turkish populations.

Also contributing to this regressive dialectics was the economically disadvantaged position of a large number of Kurds who migrated to big cities in the West and in the South from the predominately Kurdish regions, either through forced evictions by the security forces or just in order to escape the insecurity of life and the economic livelihood that had become increasingly precarious in the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s as a result of armed conflict.⁴⁰ Since Kurdish immigrants are conspicuously poor, which exacerbates their “otherness,” ethnic diversity has become the source of an enhanced inter-group hostility as poverty has acquired an ethnic dimension in the big cities. In such an environment, Kurds appeared to be and were frequently presented as the main beneficiaries of the means-tested social assistance measures, with limited coverage and very low level of benefits, introduced by the AKP government to alleviate poverty. The policies targeting poor families with children have especially aggravated the negative attitudes of the Turkish majority toward Kurds who are now seen to have a disproportionate share in social spending. Kurds, with their large families, have become the epitome of the undeserving poor. Such anti-Kurdish sentiments have escalated with each armed assault by the PKK.⁴¹

In this environment of spiraling distrust, the DTP, the political party representing the Kurdish population, could have contributed to the resolution of conflict in collaboration with

other parties represented in the parliament.⁴² Yet the DTP has been under pressure from the now re-radicalized PKK as well as from the increasingly hostile political establishment, and is currently facing a court case that might end with the closing of the party. Such a court decision would seriously undermine Kurdish political participation through their democratically elected representatives and further erode the hopes for their democratic inclusion in society.

Given that Kurds have a fair claim to equal basic rights, the repeated attempts at curbing their political participation, the electoral system with its ten percent quota excluding the Kurdish parties, and the failure of instituting the rule of law in the region⁴³ could very well ignite calls for the establishment of a promised and yet never realized political equality between the Turks and the Kurds. However, we now observe the emergence of a new type of “solution” to the problem. Situated in the context of Islamic revival in Turkey, where government-encouraged attempts to make religious identity an increasingly dominant determinant of social relations are in ascendance, existence of an alternative to modern solidarity among strangers is now beginning to be articulated. The alternative in question appeals to common Islamic identity as a unifying force beyond ethnic divisions.⁴⁴ An explicit statement in this regard appeared in a report⁴⁵ on the Kurdish issue prepared by the Foundation of Civil Society Organizations, an umbrella institution bringing together a large number of mostly conservative NGOs. This alternative solidarity project draws on Sunni Islam and is promoted by the active involvement of voluntary initiatives, in particular Gülen-inspired initiative from intellectual think tanks, business organizations, and charitable associations, apart from the media organizations that are directly and indirectly financed by the faith-based initiatives. These organizations and other NGOs of an Islamic character now carry out many activities in the regions with predominantly Kurdish populations, mainly through massive campaigns of Islamic charity that compensate for the inadequacy of formal, rights-based social policy mechanisms. The results of the last general election in July 2007 indicate that the electorate in eastern and southeastern Turkey has responded favorably to these activities. The AKP has dramatically increased its votes in the region undermining the supremacy that the DTP and its predecessors used to enjoy in the last several elections.

With the difficulties faced by the DTP, which is alienated from the political establishment and demonized by much of the media that highlights its closeness to the PKK, the promise of this Islamic solidarity is likely to improve the chances of the AKP in the next municipal elections where it could win the majority of the municipalities in the east and the southeast, some of which now have mayors from the DTP, including Diyarbakır, the symbolic capital of the region. Such an electoral victory of the AKP might increase the chances of success for the model of Islamic solidarity in controlling the Kurdish conflict with the cooperation of local middle classes, who would be happy to contribute to the containment of popular dissatisfaction with measures involving large-scale mobilization of private benevolence. Such success at the regional level would contribute to the predominance of the model of Islamic solidarity on a national scale.

Nevertheless, the model in question, a form of *s*, cannot be expected to form an inclusive framework of social participation on the basis of equal status either in the Kurdish region or in the country as a whole. It would leave the poor on the receiving end of an unequal charity relationship, and it is limited in its ability to assure the social participation of women as equal members of society.⁴⁶ Furthermore, it would exclude non-Sunni minorities, post-religious and irreligious citizens, or for that matter anyone who would feel threatened by the dominance of orthodox Sunni religion in social life. Yet, it is likely that a sizable portion of the Kurdish population will find this suboptimal resolution agreeable in the present historical moment

where the possibility of solidarity triangulated with liberty and equality is an increasingly dim possibility. Of course, some political actors closer to the DPT or the PKK might resist both of these alternative scenarios and the ground might be prepared for a form of federalism or separation. In this case, the type of solidarity to emerge in the new political formation would be the outcome of peaceful or violent negotiations among new actors opting for alternative forms of coexistence, either based on inclusive policies and institutions or relying on ethnic identity and common descent.

V. Conclusion

In this paper, we sought to articulate the distinctive normative and empirical features of what we called S among strangers and s among familiars. We argued that the rise of common culture, familiarity, and sameness-based narrow solidarities can be considered to be the outcomes of the political failure of a project of solidarity of strangers. We underlined that solidarity seems to be a primary aspect of social existence, and it does not tend to disappear from the face of any type of society, no matter how different the relevant contexts may be. Solidarity exists, in one form or another, everywhere and at all times.

Observing the current proliferation of the regressive dialectics set off by the politics of narrow solidarities, we argued that it would be naïve to adopt an evolutionary perspective and assume that societies which have succeeded in instituting a solidarity of strangers *once* would not and could not experience backlashes. The reverse is also true, societies can switch from solidarity regimes that are partly exclusivist and based on sameness to the more progressive model that is based on a solidarity that is compatible with cultural diversity. Although we primarily focused on a regressive dialectics in this paper, a progressive dialectics is indeed possible as long as the right time to do so would be captured and the full inclusion that is formalized and substantiated through a set of basic rights is achieved. If the window of opportunity to establish an inclusive solidarity regime that forges bonds among strangers is missed, however, then an already eroded or a never really realized solidarity of strangers, indeed the very project of it, would also get replaced by more exclusivist solidarity projects that are based on sameness. The society may find itself fragmented into groups that relate to one another as hostile and alien “cultures.”

The Kurdish issue in Turkey provides a rich example that embodies the likely outcomes and the phases of a regressive dialectics set off by the precarious absence of an inclusive S model. It also shows that timing matters and the missed historical moments to switch to democratic inclusion and an equal freedom regime perpetuate and contribute to the consolidation of a regressive model as a societal project.

Although the Islamic revival in Turkey, the rise of the Islamic notion of solidarity as the model of membership⁴⁷ are closely related with the harmonious rise of neoliberalism alongside multiculturalism, the Kurdish issue is an old one and the most pressing problem for Turkey. Within the context of missed opportunities, systematic regeneration of distrust among communities, and the lack of political actors who mobilize to institute a solidarity among strangers, the Islamic model of solidarity vies for the resolution of the Kurdish issue through the integration of the middle class and the Sunni components of the Kurdish population. If successful in co-opting the Sunni Kurds and in moderately easing the tension among Sunni Turks and Kurds, we fear that the Islamic model of membership would not remain applicable merely to the Kurdish issue or the Kurdish region, but would consolidate itself as the new membership model of contemporary Turkey. This regressive dialectics would further

aggravate the exclusion of women and the subordination of the poor, and it would result in the rise of new groups of excluded people who are neither Sunni nor religious.

The point of presenting this apocalyptic vision and talking about missed opportunities is to emphasize the fact that the normative superiority of the solidarity model S is toothless unless adopted and sustained by political agency. Beyond its normative significance and superiority, the model of solidarity among strangers is a political project that can only be enlivened and brought to life by the constant supply of political actors who adopt it. *This* seems to be the very ingredient that is missing in the present day Turkey. Regressive dialectics is not the inevitable outcome of the fragmented solidarity structure, but it would become inevitable when the political agents are blind to the solidarity of strangers as a viable political project and when they are accustomed to receive narrow solidarities based on sameness as only “natural.”

Even backlashes, however, may not indicate that new opportunities and new actors would not present themselves again. When responding to a question as to whether a democratic regime that is compatible with European standards could satisfy the demands of Kurds in Turkey, Sezgin Tanrikulu, the Diyarbakır Bar Association’s President, responded that today Kurds do not feel they are equal and free citizens of the Republic. Tanrikulu continued to say that in a political context that would provide Kurds with the full exercise of their freedom of speech and their freedom to organize, the right to education in the mother tongue would also be realized. Such an environment, he said, would not generate “fragmentation paranoia.”⁴⁸

Sooner or later the Kurdish issue is going to be resolved. *How and on what sort of solidarity* Turkey is going to integrate its Kurdish population will define the new political regime of Turkey. If the Kurdish issue gets resolved by integrating the Sunni portion of the Kurdish population and its middle class into an Islam-based solidarity structure, then Turkey can only emerge out of its most pressing solidarity question as a “Muslim” democracy rather than a constitutional one, creating newly excluded groups along the way. The newly excluded would involve not only the Alevites, a part of whom are Kurdish, but also Turks and Kurds who are reform Muslims, or are agnostic, atheist, irreligious, and/or homosexuals, feminists and the like. All of these groups would be composed of individuals who might have Muslim sounding names but are not importantly, if at all, religious. Re-integration on the basis of Sunni Islam can only render it impossible for them to become equally free members of the society.⁴⁹ In case of secession, the problem of solidarity would only duplicate itself. Turks “here” and Kurds “there” would still have to find ways to forge solidarities within their own ethnic groups, either by excluding or including the strangers that reside within their communities.

POSTSCRIPT

After this article was completed, in July 2009, the AKP government launched what is called the *Kurdish Democratic Opening*. Before it became clear what the democratization package involved, the Constitutional Court issued the decision to close the DTP (Dec 11, 2009). Immediately after the closure, the DTP was replaced by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). On December 26, 2010, the first pages of most Turkish newspapers had a photo of handcuffed Kurdish mayors,⁵⁰ now BDP members, arrested to be interrogated in the context of a massive operation against urban militant organizations affiliated with the PKK. Notwithstanding the support given to the operation by the pro-government media,⁵¹ the picture triggered a widespread reaction in democratic circles. Nevertheless, similar operations continue, the last of which took place over the period of February 13–14 and also involved the arrest of many Kurdish mayors.⁵²

In retrospect, even before the closure of the party, there were certain developments that indicated the determination of the government block to reinforce their favored solidarity model with little tolerance for political dissent. The municipal elections in March 2009 led to a considerable loss of votes by the AKP. In the Eastern and the Southeastern provinces where the Kurds form a majority, DTP was clearly the winner of the election. The election results heightened the hostility both against the DTP and some of the secularly inclined NGOs active in the region. A particularly significant episode was the police action taken against the *Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği* (the Organization for the Protection of Secular Life, CYDD) that has been active in the schooling of girls in the Kurdish region. After a sustained campaign undertaken by the daily *Zaman*, which alleged that the CYDD was providing support to PKK,⁵³ the offices of the CYDD were raided by the police, their computers were seized, and its managers were arrested and interrogated. During these operations the founding director of the CYDD, a well-respected medical doctor who had made a unique contribution to eradicating leprosy in the country, was terminally ill, which did not change the fact that she was subjected to police interrogations that interfered with her treatment. More recently, the activities of *Sarmaşık* – a Diyarbakir based charity organization that collaborated with the former DTP, now BDP, municipality – were suspended by court action. This is an incident that reveals how badly the government and the AKP affiliated religious charities feel, and are adamant about, the need for monopolize civil society to distribute funds in kind assistance to the poor. In fact, immediately after the suspension of the activities of *Sarmaşık*, the Governor of Diyarbakir asked the organization to submit the list of the beneficiaries of *Sarmaşık*'s funds stating that they would take over the assistance program.⁵⁴

In this atmosphere of fear and hostility, it is doubtful how and to what extent the “democratic Kurdish opening” could prove to be successful.

NOTES

1. See Hauke Brunkhorst, *Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005); Jürgen Habermas, *Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews*, ed. Peter Dewes (London: Verso, 1986); N. Karagiannis, “Introduction,” *European Solidarity*, ed. Karagiannis (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007), 1–12; Will Kymlicka and K. Banting, “Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 20 (2006): 281–304; P. van Parijs, ed., *Cultural Diversity versus Economic Solidarity* (Bruxelles: De Boeck, 2004); D. R. Walhof, “Friendship, Otherness, and Gadamer’s Politics of Solidarity,” *Political Theory* 34 (2006): 569–593; L. Wilde, “The Concept of Solidarity: Emerging from the Theoretical Shadows?” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 9 (2007): 171–189.

2. See T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950).

3. For a recent work that links rights to solidarity explicitly, see Alan Gewirth, *The Community of Rights* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), esp. sec. 1.2 and ch. 3. Gewirth argues that human rights, the correlative duties they generate, and the mutual respect they entail create a mutualist and egalitarian universality that forms the basis of social solidarity in a complex society.

4. See Craig Calhoun, *Nations Matter: Culture History, and the Cosmopolitan Dream* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), 108–111).

5. See Y. N. Soysal, “Changing parameters of citizenship and claims-making: Organized Islam in European public spheres,” *Theory and Society* 26 (1997): 509–527.

6. See Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society*, trans. George Simpson (Glencoe, Ill. : Free Press, 1933). We should note that while Durkheim’s organic solidarity, which is based on the division of labor in a society, has nothing to do with our conception of solidarity among strangers; mechanical solidarity is a form of solidarity with small s and as such related to what Helmut Ritter calls “irrational solidarity.” See the discussion that follows.

7. See Wilde, “The Concept of Solidarity.”

8. Brunkhorst, *Solidarity*, 64.

9. See Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972).
10. See Claus Offe, "How can we trust our fellow citizens?" *Democracy and Trust*, ed. Mark E. Warren, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 42–87.
11. Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition," *The Inclusion of The Other: Studies in Political Theory*, eds. Ciaran P. Cronin and Pablo De Greiff (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990): 203–238, 245.
12. Helmut Ritter, "Irrational Solidarity Groups: A Socio-Psychological Study in Connection with Ibn Khaldūn," *Oriens I* (1948): 1–44.
13. See Calhoun, *Nations Matter*, 105; David Miller "Social Justice in Multicultural Societies," *Cultural Diversity versus Economic Solidarity*, ed. Philippe van Parijs (Bruxelles: De Boeck, 2004): 13–32, 15.
14. Zygmunt Bauman, "On Communitarians and Human Freedom or, How to Square the Circle," *Theory, Culture & Society* 13, no. 2 (1996): 79–90, 84.
15. W. Outhwaite, "Who Needs Solidarity?" *European Solidarity*, ed. N. Karagiannis (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007): 75–93, 88–89.
16. See B. Barry, *Culture and Equality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2002); Miller "Social Justice in Multicultural Societies."
17. Van Parijs, *Cultural Diversity versus Economic Solidarity*.
18. See Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); for a critical perspective see H. Kwon. "Associations, Civic Norms, and Democracy: Revisiting the Italian Case," *Theory and Society* 33 (2004): 135–166.
19. P. Wagner, "Freedom and Solidarity: Retrieving the European Political Tradition of Non-individualist Liberalism," *European Solidarity*: 15–31, 27).
20. Barry, *Culture and Equality*, chs. 7 and 8.
21. See, for example, van Parijs *Cultural Diversity versus Economic Solidarity*.
22. See Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth. *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange* (New York: Verso, 2003): 244 and 257–8.
23. For an exploration of both theoretical and empirical issues around this problem, see van Parijs *Cultural Diversity versus Economic Solidarity*.
24. Seyla Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism (The Berkeley Tanner Lectures)* (New York: Oxford University Press 2006), 177.
25. The contemporary significance of voluntary benevolence is quite accurately described in an article in the *Guardian*: "The 19th century was the age of capitalism, the 20th the age of socialism. The 21st century is going to be the age of charity, or so we are given hope" (S. Jenkins, "Welfare State Is Waning. Bring on the Philanthropists," *The Guardian*, June 28, 2006). In a similar vein, it is suggested that "The notion that voluntarism and social entrepreneurship are inherently superior to the dead hand of the state provision plays the same sentiment as (the Tory leader) Mr. Cameron's elegant riposte to Margaret Thatcher that "there is such a thing as society, it's just not the same thing as the state" (*Economist*, "The Fight over a Big Idea," July 22–28, 2006: 44). For a discussion, see A. Buğra and K. Ağartan, *Reading Karl Polanyi for the 21st Century: Market Economy as a Political Project* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2007).
26. Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism*, 174–175.
27. See C. Pateman, "The Patriarchal Welfare State", in *Democracy and The Welfare State*, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988): 231–260.
28. See *Ibid.*; Nancy Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Post-socialist' Age," *New left Review* 212 (1995): 68–93.
29. See Jeffery Flynn, "Translator's Introduction," Brunkhorst, *Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community*, vii–xxi.
30. Brunkhorst, *Solidarity*, 2.
31. See H. Bozarslan "Türkiye'de Kürt Milliyetçiliği: Zımnı Sözleşmeden Ayaklanmaya 1919–1925," *İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete Türkiye'de Etnik Çatışma*, ed. E. J. Zürcher (Istanbul: İletişim, 2005), M. van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan* (London: Zed Books, 1992), and Bruinessen, "Kurdish Society, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Refugee Problems," *The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview*, eds. Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).
32. M. Yeğen, "Citizenship and Ethnicity in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 6 (2004): 51–66.
33. For example, the decision of the Constitutional Court to close the Labor Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi) after the military intervention of 1971 was closely related to the party's democratic position vis-à-vis the Kurdish demands (Yeğen, *Müstakbel Türk'ten Sözde Vatandaşa: Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler* (Istanbul: İletişim 2006): 164–167). More recently, the court case against the Teacher's Union (Eğitim Sen), which ended with a decision favorable to the union, had to do with the articulation of Kurdish demands in the realm of education.

34. The regional indicators provided by the Human Development Report for Turkey, *Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World* (Pittsburg, PA: Hoechstetter Printing Co, 2004) clearly indicate the extent of the backwards of the East and the Southeast in income terms as well as in life expectancy, adult literacy and school enrolment.

35. See Bruinessen, "Kurdish Society, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Refugee Problems."

36. See Aysel Tuğluk's comments in the roundtable discussion led by İrfan Aktan in *Birikim* 226: 20–47, 2008. At the time Aysel Tuğluk was the co-chair of Democratic Society Party, DTP. See fn. 14.

37. See Aktan, "PKK Uzun Bir Savaşta Hazırlanıyor," *Birikim* 224 (2007): 17–26.

38. See E. Alataş, "Kürt Sorununda Muhatap Kimdir?" *Birikim*, 224, (2007): 27–30; Aktan "PKK Uzun Bir Savaşta Hazırlanıyor."

39. Aktan, "PKK Uzun Bir Savaşta Hazırlanıyor."

40. There are several studies on internally displaced Kurdish people conducted by the non-governmental research institute TESEV and by a center on migration research affiliated with Hacettepe University. See Aker, T., et al, *Türkiye'de Ülke İçinde Yerinden Edilme Sorunu* (Istanbul: TESEV, 2005) and Hacettepe Nüfus Etütleri Enstitüsü, *Türkiye'de Göç ve Yerinden Olmuş Nüfus Araştırması* (Ankara, 2006).

41. For example, Mine Kırıkkanat, who contributes to the editorial columns of the daily *Vatan* writes that "the clueless state" is trying to expand the population of "PKK-affiliated Kurds" by "taking money from out of our pockets" to give social assistance to "ignorants who beget 10 to 20 kids from two or three wives . . ." She continues by stating that "Turks begin to feel that they can no longer carry, or finance the offspring, or bear the tribes, customs, ignorance of such people, they begin to feel that they want to reject to live together with the Kurds." The title of her editorial is tellingly called "Parasitic Brotherhood." (Mine Kırıkkanat, "Asalak Kardeşlik," *Vatan*, 7 (December 2005)).

42. The DTP (Democratic Society Party) is the last one of a series of Kurdish parties that were formed and participated in general elections starting with the early 1990s. These parties, the HEP (People's Labor Party), the DEP (Democracy party), the HADEP (People's Democracy Party and the DEHAP (Democratic People's Party), were all closed after having been accused of acting as fronts for the PKK. Of them, DEHAP dissolved itself before being closed by Constitutional Court decision like the others.

43. The rule of law in the region was at times violated by individuals and groups within the security forces pursuing a non-official anti-PKK agenda, probably with mixed political and economic motives. That such people could at times be protected by high-ranking officials was revealed by the incident of the bombing of a bookstore owned by an alleged PKK supporter in the Southeastern town of Şemdinli. See the article on the *Turkish Daily News* at <http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=28558> (last accessed on 8/20/2008).

44. See H. Yavuz, "Search for a New Social Contract in Turkey: Fethullah Gülen, Virtue Party and the Kurds," *SAS Review* 19 (1999): 114–143; and "The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and Development Party," *Middle East Policy*, 13 (2006): 102–119.

45. The report can be reached at <http://www.tgtv.org/web/guest/reklam2> (last accessed February 26, 2010).

46. See Y. Arat, "Religion, Politics and Gender Equality in Turkey: Confrontation and Coexistence," paper for the UNRISD project titled "Religion, Politics and Gender Equality", whose abstract can be accessed electronically: <http://www.awid.org/Issues-and-Analysis/Library/Religion-Politics-and-Gender-Equality-in-Turkey-Confrontation-Coexistence-or-Transformation> (last accessed February 26, 2010).

47. See Yavuz, "Search for a New Social Contract in Turkey."

48. See Neşe Düzel's interview with him in the daily *Taraf* July 22, 2008, which can be accessed electronically: <http://www.taraf.com.tr/yazar.asp?mid=1307> (last accessed August 10, 2008).

49. See Aysen Candaş' article at RESET website, http://resetdoc.org/EN/Turkey-bilgen.php?search_str=Aysen%20Candas%20Bilgen (last accessed on September 28, 2008).

50. See the headlines of the daily *Radikal*, Dec 26, 2009, "Handcuffed Democratic Opening Souvenir," which can be accessed electronically: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalHaberDetay&Date=26.12.2009&ArticleID=971177> (last accessed February 26, 2010).

51. On this, see Ertan Keskinsoy, "The Distance that Handcuff Closed," *Express*, 2010/02: 8.

52. See <http://bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/120051-kck-operasyonunda-onlarca-bdpli-gozaltinda> and <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalHaberDetay&Date=14.02.2010&ArticleID=980200> (last accessed February 26, 2010).

53. See Ahmet Insel, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalEklrDetay&ArticleID=932026> (last accessed February 26, 2010).

54. See daily *Radikal*, February 24, 2010, which can be accessed electronically: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?aType=RadikalHaberDetay&Date=14.01.2010&ArticleID=974446> (last accessed February 26, 2010).

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Candas, A. and A. Bugra (2010) "Solidarity among Strangers: a Problem of Coexistence in Turkey", *Constellations* 17(2): 293-311. CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Canefe, N. (2002) "Turkish Nationalism and Ethno-Symbolic Analysis: the Rules of Exception", *Nations and Nationalism* 8(2): 133-55. CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Ađarkođlu, A. (2010) "Public Attitudes towards the Urban Ban in Turkey", *Utrecht Law Review* 6(2): 145-57. CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Ertop, K. (1963) "Atatürk Devriminde Türk Dili", in TDK (ed.) *Atatürk ve Türk Dili*, Ankara: TDK, 53-102. Google Scholar. Solidarity Among Strangers: A Problem of Coexistence in Turkey. Ayse Bugra Aysen Candas. *Constellations* 17 (2):293-311 (2010). A Philosophy of Education as an Academic Discipline in Turkey: The Past and the Present. [REVIEW] Hasan Aöender - 2008 - *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 27 (6):405-431. Existential Phenomenology and the Conceptual Problem of Other Minds. Christian Skirke - 2014 - *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 52 (2):227-249. SolidaritÄt: Vorschlag FÄr Eine Soziologische Begriffsbestimmung. Islamophobia is the main weapon of those trying to illicitly link Islam to terrorism, stymie the coexistence of diverse cultures, and turn fascist rhetoric into political movements, said a top Turkish official at an international seminar on Islamophobia which began in Istanbul on Wednesday. The Islamic Cooperation Youth Forum (ICYF) organized the two-day seminar "Youth Global Action Countering Islamophobia," where a host of international officials and experts are discussing strategies to combat Islamophobia, particularly among Muslim young people. In a video message sent to the event, Mehmet M... In the absence of comprehensive solidarity, coexistence is bought at the expense of a new regime of exclusion. In this paper, we discuss this as a problem of solidarity and illustrate our argument with reference to the Kurdish issue in Turkey. We find it fruitful to approach the Kurdish issue from the perspective of solidarity especially at a time when an Islamic model of social integration presents itself as an alternative to genuine democratic inclusion. Turkey left behind one of the most difficult summers of its history as the Constitutional Court was seeking to close down its ruling party,...