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The Cold War has ended and the debate about the postwar world rages. Some maintain that greater cooperation is emerging rapidly; others disagree and long for a return to the good old days–or what we may have mistakenly thought the bad old days.[1] This chapter assesses and criticizes both the optimistic and pessimistic schools of thought. We argue that assessment of the post–Cold War world depends critically on judgments about the nature of the Cold War and its end. We develop a regionally differentiated perspective on the post–Cold War world, one that recognizes the multidimensional character of its end.

Optimists who point to a more peaceful world emphasize the stabilizing influence of increased global trade and economic interdependence among

1. In a terminological shift, some now refer to the Cold War as "the long peace" (Gaddis 1986, 1987).

states and of political and economic liberalization, as well as the increased effectiveness of international institutions and regimes in managing conflict. From this optimistic outlook, the end of the Cold War has made it possible to link all areas of the globe in an economic web. It has also freed international institutions from the paralysis of U.S.-Soviet Cold War rivalry and brought the domestic liberalization of totalitarian regimes and the more pacific foreign policies that are presumed to accompany such liberalization.[2]

Pessimists point out, however, that the end of the Cold War has unleashed new violence and unrest in some regions and nations. To them, the end of the Cold War has simply led to the resurgence of long-suppressed hypernationalism, inter- and intrastate fighting among and within new states, and increased tensions within formerly united alliances. The emergence of multipolarity, they argue, means a more conflictual and unstable present and future.[3]

Optimists and pessimists agree that the Cold War s impact was transitory and that its end will have globally uniform consequences, but they disagree about the nature of those effects in both eras. First, all assume the Cold War to have had a short-lived effect on interstate relations. Optimists hold that because the Cold War divided the world into two distinct camps, its end will bring a return to the world economy that existed before World War I. Pessimists claim that because the Cold War suppressed ethnic hatred and restrained regional states, its end explains the recent return to ethnic cleansing and aggressive behavior. Second, both suggest that the end of the Cold War will have a single, uniform, and global impact on world politics. The optimistic view sees the end of the Cold War as contributing to greater global cooperation; the pessimistic one predicts greater global conflict. Bur in both cases, the ramifications are the same everywhere.

We offer an alternative interpretation on the Cold War era and the post–Cold War order. After describing the two standard perspectives on the role

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2. The once moribund United Nations has successfully expelled Iraq from Kuwait and brokered agreements among disputants in the western Sahara, Cambodia, and Namibia. The Security Council had nor approved an operation such as that against Iraq since its authorization of military force against North Korea in 1950, which was approved only because the Soviet delegation was absent from the Security Council meeting. For a recent discussion of UN of eraficus, including those in Bosnia, Somalia, and Cambodia, see DiehI 1993.

3. Some of the pessimists arc realists who see the end of the Cold War as a change in, bur not of, the system. They expect char the international system will continue to be characterized by anarchy, which constrains the behavior of stares and inhibits cooperation even among those with shared interests. They do, however, find multipolarity to be more unstable than the bipolarity of the Cold War.

of the Cold War and the permanence of its consequences, we offer our own view, that although the bipolar structure of the international system and the intense ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union globalized many regional, local, and even domestic disputes, the rate and extent of superpower penetration of regional politics varied greatly across space and over time. We then analyze four distinct but concatenated dimensions of the Cold War's end, and finally, we discuss the emerging post–Cold War order, especially the increasing regionalization of world politics and its impact on security (and trade). We argue that the end of the Cold War will have the greatest effect on regional relations in locales that were highly penetrated by the superpowers and will have little or no effect on regions and disputes that were unaffected by the Cold War or remained on its periphery.

As with the Cold War order, that of the post–Cold War era has been influenced by geographic pressures, especially the continued importance of regions and regionalism, as well as by structural forces of the international balance of power. We maintain that the interplay of these pressures constitutes a "geostructural" perspective of international politics. By ignoring either of these characteristics of world politics, it is difficult to understand the effect that the Cold War will have on regional relations in the post–Cold War world.[4]

Alternative Perspectives

There are two basic interpretations of how the Cold War and its end have affected regional relations. They disagree about whether superpower intervention in regional politics during the Cold War increased or decreased regional conflict and whether superpower disengagement from regional politics in the post–Cold War era will contribute to stability or conflict. The conflict-suppression school emphasizes the stabilizing consequences of superpower involvement even as it argues that the superpowers globalized local disputes. The conflict-exacerbation school emphasizes the superpowers' creation and expansion of small disputes as well as their militarization of political conflicts.

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4. On the debate over the primacy of globalism or regionalism, see Gannon 1982 and Doran 1989.

GLOBALIZATION AND CONFLICT SUPPRESSION

One perspective, rooted entirely in a view of the Cold War as globalizing and suppressing regional conflicts, argues that age-old rivalries and animosities suppressed during the Cold War are again at the fore. This argument holds that the superpowers restrained their respective clients and suppressed regional conflicts by stationing troops, extending security commitments, rejecting or limiting the shipment of advanced offensive weaponry, applying political pressure, and using economic rewards and punishments to elicit certain behavior.[5]

Central to this argument is that the history of the Cold War is one of superpower involvements all over the globe. Military and economic support allowed regional conflicts to escalate well beyond the level that local clients could sustain financially. Sophisticated weaponry raised the intensity of wars by allowing local states to engage in large-scale modern warfare, while superpower arms resupplies helped belligerent states to prolong conflicts. The infusion of economic assistance allowed small powers to live beyond their means. The conflict between the Vietnamese, for example, both before and after the nation's partition, could not have been sustained for as long or as intensely without superpower support. U.S. aid was essential to the contras in their struggle against the Nicaraguan government. Many other local conflicts, although not begun by the superpowers, were clearly nurtured by their rivalry.

But the compelling element of this perspective is that the superpowers also restrained their clients, especially when events threatened to get out of control. Even when they encouraged their clients to pursue military solutions to regional conflicts, the superpowers restrained them as well—particularly when events threatened to suck them in. With Israel on the verge of crushing the encircled Egyptian Third Army Corps in 1973, the Soviets threatened unilateral intervention if Israel did not halt its operations. So to prevent the possibility of a direct great-power conflict, the United States warned Israel that it would not be allowed to destroy the Third Army (Quandt 1977).

This perspective reflects a seemingly contradictory vision of bipolarity, in which the bloc leaders contest every region and issue but manage their

5. Doran (1991) notes that one of the reasons that the war between Iran and Iraq (1980–88) lasted so long is that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had ties to Tehran or Baghdad. In concrast, the Soviets refused to deliver the advanced weaponry that would have allowed Egypt to extend the Arab-Israefi War of Attrition (1969–70) to Israel's heartland (Breslauer 1979; Glassman 1975). In the case of the Indo-Pakisrani conflict, the United States never supplied Pakistan with enough military supplies to wage an extended war (Barnds 1972).

clients and their conflict.[6] The common brief for the stabilizing effect of bipolarity is that competition between the superpowers comes to encompass all regions. There are no peripheries, since either power's gain will upset the delicate global balance of power. Accordingly, all local and even domestic conflicts are absorbed into the bipolar contest; in effect, all regions are globalized. This view implies that local conflicts were exacerbated during the Cold War, since they came to involve global stakes and the survival of the superpowers themselves. Yet this argument also emphasizes that the superpowers nonetheless suppressed regional disputes and restrained their clients for fear that a regional quarrel would ensnare them in a direct confrontation that might escalate into a nuclear exchange. In some instances, their shared interest in avoiding a war actually contributed to superpower coordination as they managed regional disputes.[7]

GLOBALIZATION AND CONFLICT EXACERBATION

A second, equally compelling argument about the current world, rooted entirely in a view of the Cold War as an era of superpower competition fostering regional conflict (Slater 1990–91; Hurewitz 1973; Weiss and Blight 1992), argues that without superpower kindling, regional disputes die down. Whether through the active mischief making of the superpowers or because of wily, manipulative clients, the Cold War generated conflicts in all parts of the globe.

From this perspective, superpower competition for global influence exacerbated and prolonged regional disputes in an intensive and extensive bipolar rivalry. Eventually encompassing the entire planet, this rivalry even reached regions in which the superpowers had only marginal interests. Vying to increase their influence and gain any advantage at the expense of the other, both sought new clients. Where they did not actively create local clients to oppose their opponent's clients, they nurtured and encouraged indigenous

6. During the bipolar Cold War, both superpowers sought to prevent a repeat of World War I, in which Austria puffed its great-power patron, Germany, into war with Russia. On the Middle East, see Miller 1990 and Freedman 1990. For a discussion of great powers exercising restraint on their clients even during a multipofar period, see Schroeder 1976.

7. In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Basic Principles Agreement, which established a set of rules of conduct (or the superpowers in the Middle East. In part, chis agreement called for the superpowers to "exercise restraint in their mutual relations, and [to] be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means" (Quandt 1977). In 1981, Premier Brezhnev called for a "code of good behavior" with the United States in regard to Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Allison and Williams 1990).

opposition. By setting brush fires and playing troublemaker, they tried to wear one another down.

The bipolar structure of the Cold War also allowed local disputants to maneuver the superpowers to advance those disputants' interests.[8] Those seeking support from Washington took on the mantle of anti-Communism; those looking for Soviet support sold themselves as opponents of Western imperialism. Local rivals could extort extensive political, economic, and military support from the superpowers by framing local issues in East-West terms and by threatening to abandon one superpower for the other. The end of the Cold War also implies, therefore, the end of such easily obtained and generous support.

Even when the superpowers did not actively encourage local conflict, their guarantees alone encouraged clients to pursue reckless foreign policies (Rubin 1988). Confident that a patron would come to their rescue, local states often took greater risks in relations with their neighbors. The patron's commitment could be presumed by even marginal regional clients whose defeat might damage the superpower s credibility in other regions or simply damage the reputation of its military hardware. Even implicit or presumed guarantees therefore tended to exacerbate local disputes.

From this view, the superpower competition for influence internationalized domestic disputes and globalized regional ones. The superpowers engaged one another in wars by proxy, and their military assistance increased the death and destruction wrought by poor players in local conflicts that persisted beyond their natural course. Hence, the end of the Cold War has meant the diminution of regional conflict.

These alternative perspectives are neither fully complementary nor fully contradictory. The first characterizes the Cold War as a superpower lid on regional hostility. The second sees the superpowers as stoking the flames of regional conflict Both agree that the Cold War globalized international politics and expanded the scope and importance of regional disputes. Both agree that the impact of the Cold War will have been temporary and the post–Cold War world will witness a reversion to prior form—in one case to regional disputes uncontrolled by great powers, in the other to regional stability uninflamed by superpower involvement.

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8. Although international relations theory focuses mainly on great powers, under some conditions the tail (i.e., the client) can wag the dog (i.e., the great power). There is a small literature, which emerged rapidly after the heightened activity of Third World states in the early 1970s and especially after the success of the 1973 Arab oil embargo (which transferred extreme wealth from the First World to the Third World), on the ability of small states to influence the behavior of great powers (Bergsten 1973; Keohane 1971; Handel 1982).

	Cold War	
	Ephemeral	Lasting
Lid	Revert to Instability	Sustained Restraint
Superpower		
Stoker	Regional Solutions and Cooperation	Sustained Conflict

Fig. 5.1. The Cold War and its effect on regional relations

More generally, arguments about the post–Cold War world derive from assessments of the Cold War and its impact. The prospect for the emergence of regional security arrangements will depend upon whether the superpowers were involved in a region and, if so, whether they acted as lids on, or stokers of, regional conflict—whether they restrained their regional clients and suppressed conflict or encouraged competition and exacerbated regional disputes. It also matters how reversible the Cold War proves to be. The Cold War can be seen as lasting if it fundamentally transformed certain regions of the globe by the ideological cast given to domestic political struggles during the era, by the forms of political organization and control that remain as its residue, by the new levels of armaments that remain in its wake, and by the economic development it nurtured. Alternatively, the Cold War will prove to have had ephemeral consequences if the regions revert to their previous state.

Figure 5.1 highlights the possible impact that the Cold War era will have on regions in the post–Cold War order.[9] If the Cold War suppressed regional conflict but its effect is only ephemeral, the outlook is a reversion to regional instability. Similarly, if the Cold War fostered regional conflict and if this

9. Scholars with different views of the effect of the Cold War on regional relations can still arrive ac similar conclusions concerning the nature of the new world order. Those who argue that superpower involvement in regional relations contributed to only temporary stability and those who hold that superpower competition has permanently exacerbated regional rivalry both anticipate that the new world order will be characterized by conflict. Similarly, scholars who believe that superpower competition only fueled regional hostilities temporarily and those who see char superpower involvement as having permanently dampened regional hostilities both expect a peaceful new world order.

rivalry left a lasting impression on the region, the outcome will be sustained conflict. In contrast, if the Cold War restrained local states and if this left a lasting imprint on regional relations, the product will be continued restraint in the behavior of the local actors. Likewise, if the Cold War provoked regional conflict but had no lasting effect on regional relations, cooperation among local actors will be possible.

In this chapter, we argue that different parts of the globe fall into these different cells and do so on different dimensions. We argue that the end of the Cold War is a multidimensional phenomenon with regionally differentiated implications. We begin our reanalysis by characterizing the regional variation that remained despite the globalizing consequences of the Cold War.

The Cold War and Regional Security

Two Cold War forces, the bipolar structure of the international system and the intense ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, globalized many regional, local, and even domestic disputes. Eventually, the Cold War came to encompass the entire planet; local disputes in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America came to be framed in East-West terms. The need of each superpower to demonstrate its willingness to defend or support local states that espoused its ideology militarized and linked isolated conflicts, involving the United States and the Soviet Union in regions where neither had substantial interests or historic ties.

Yet even at the height of the globalization of the Cold War, regional differentiation remained a salient feature of world politics. On the one hand, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia were highly penetrated by the superpowers and were drawn into the Cold War competition in its initial stages. Much of Africa and Latin America, on the other hand, remained on the fringe of the superpower rivalry for most of the Cold War.

This interaction of geography and power, this geostructural perspective, suggests that the end of the Cold War and the demise of the dual globalizing forces of bipolarity and ideology imply a growing regionalization of world politics and a localization of conflict management" The end of the Cold War, whether characterized as unipolarity or emergent multipolarity, will produce neither a global policeman nor a global concert but a localization of security relations.

FRAMING REGIONAL DISPUTES: BIPOLARITY AND IDEOLOGY

As World War Il drew to a close, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the dominant states in the international system. Their confroncation originated at the intersection of their respective zones of occupation in Europe and other borders of the Soviet empire. A circumscribed (although multiregional) politico-economic conflict eventually became worldwide as many local disputes were framed in East-West terms. It also became military as well as political and economic. Two Cold War forces, the bipolar structure of the international system and the intense ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, were primarily responsible for this state of affairs.

The bipolar structure of the Cold War absorbed regional conflicts into the U.S.-Soviet struggle. Local states sought superpower support in the form of arms and economic aid, and the United States and the USSR competed for local allies and influence. Eventually the United States and Soviet Union became involved in all regions of the globe, linking disparate regions and nations that had no historic ties. That the superpowers attempted to gain any advantage meant that each allowed the other to dictate its regional interests and that both were dragged into places in which neither had any prior interests and that made little contribution to their respective security.

The second globalizing force was ideology. Both the United States and the USSR claimed universal objectives in their competition. The United States exported market capitalism and opposed the spread of Communism everywhere; the Soviet Union wanted to export Communism. The United States felt that it could not allow Communism to triumph, especially by expansion, without responding; the Soviets could not allow a Communist regime to succumb without making some effort on its behalf. The United States, for example, which left the Korean peninsula shortly after World War II, returned when North Korean forces invaded the south. The Soviets felt they had little choice but to support a Communist outpost in Cuba, even though they lacked the power to deter or defend territory so far from their home.

During the Cold War, local conflicts were sometimes absorbed by the superpower rivalry. The conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine antedated the Cold War, but was sucked up by it (just as it had been by World Wars I and II) as the United States replaced Britain and France as the primary supporter of Israel and the moderate Arab states. The Soviet Union champi-

oned Arab governments and nongovernmental movements that opposed the West and Israel.[10]

Similarly, the final collapse of the European empires in the wake of World War II and the struggles to achieve independence from European colonial rule were also absorbed by an ever more encompassing Cold War.[11] Vietnam provides a poignant case. After 1945 the French returned to Vietnam in the hope of reestablishing their colonial rule. But the years of wartime occupation byJapan had strengthened Vietnamese nationalists, who already had ties to the Soviet Union. The French government wanted American support in Southeast Asia and framed the conflict in Vietnam as a struggle between Communism and the West. Initially, Washington perceived the struggle as nationalist and resisted French requests for Support.[12] But the outbreak of the Korean War brought a dramatic change in American policy toward Vietnam as the United States came to see the Cold War in global terms and so accepted French arguments.[13] Eventually, the United States replaced the French militarily and waged an ill-fated battle against those Vietnamese supported by the Soviet Union.

GLOBALIZATION VERSUS REGIONALIZATION DURING THE COLD WAR

Even during the Cold War, scholars disagreed about the extent to which the United States should intervene in regional politics, though they all identified

10. On how the Jewish-Arab conflict was drawn into the great-power rivalry before World War II, see Brown 1984. Brown devises for the Eastern Question (the decline of the Ottoman Empire) a set of rules that outlines the behavior of regional and outside players since the nineteenth century. Two of his rules of the game are that "political initiatives generated withiEl the area [the Middle East are undertaken-more than in other parts of the world-with an eye to the reaction of the outside" and "outsiders are brought in until all are involved." Middle East actors "internationalize" any regional conflict, pulling outside states into the region. For Brown, these characteristics of the Middle East explain why no single great power has been able to dominate the region.

11. See Kent 1993 and Louis 1977 on how the Cold War helped Britain retain its Asian empire. See Mason 1977 on how the Cold War internationalized the Korean conflict.

12. Opposition to France was tempered, however, by the U.S. need for French support in Europe and by American worries about the plight of the French people and the possibility that they would choose a Communist government themselves.

13. As the Cold War began to replace the notion of postwar U.S.-Soviet cooperation, the United States reversed its anticolonial stance (Rotter 1987; VanDeMark 1991; LaFeber 1975; Herring 1977). For studies of the early history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, see Young 1991 and Hess 1987. Ironically, a domestic debate within the United States during the Vietnam War involved precisely this question whether the war in Vietnam was a nationalist struggle with local roots or part of the global war between the Communist world and the West.

key regions of the globe, particularly Europe and Japan, as crucial to U.S. security and to the global balance of power.[14] Soft-line realists like Walter Lippmann, George Kennan, and Hans Morgenthau argued that not all regions of the globe were of equal value to the United States.[15] Instead, they wanted to distinguish between vital and nonvital commitments and called for American restraint throughout most of the Third World, which they considered nonvital.[16] They opposed the universal commitment of the Truman Doctrine's call for the United States to defend any state threatened by Communism and objected to the general military buildup demanded by NSC-68.

Kennan held that only five centers of industrial and military power in the world (the United States, Great Britain, Germany and central Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan) were important to the United Stares (Kennan 1951, 1967a; Gaddis 1982, 25-88). Since only one of these was in hostile hands, Kennan saw containment as intended to ensure that none of the others fell into Soviet control. For only by conquering some or all of these vital power centers could the Soviet Union, or any other challenger to the United States, shift the balance of power in its own favor.

The Cold War had a critical economic dimension, for successful regional and national economic development would signify the success of a superpower's economic system, strengthen its clients as a bulwark, and tie its allies and clients more tightly to it. The United States initially focused on the economic recovery of Europe in order to contain Communism and subsequently emphasized economic development as the key to containing Soviet expansion elsewhere.[17] In varying degrees, the United States promoted the establishment of institutions and policies intended to promote the economic growth of its allies and clients. Taking the lead in re-creating a multilateral trading system, the United States oversaw the creation of the Bretton Woods agreement (1944), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction (World Bank), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Several collective management systems, such as the Group of Ten

14. Although realists disagreed about whether the United States should pursue a policy of limited containment or coral containment of the Soviet Union.

15. Here we adopt Combs's (1983) distinction between soft-line and hardline realists. David (1989) identifies Combs's soft-Iine realists as hyperrealists.

16. In many ways, the Nixon Doctrine embodied soft-fine realism. It called for the United Scares to retreat from the Third World while reaffirming the primacy of Western Europe and Japan.

17. Beginning in the mid-l950s, the literature on modernization theory made a similar assumption. Scholars such as Lipset (1960), Lerner (1958), and Rostow (1960) argued that there was a direct link between a state's level of economic development and the likelihood of its becoming a democracy.

(1961) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, emerged to coordinate economic policy among the industrialized powers. Finally, the United States sponsored several regional economic development programs. The Marshall Plan, for example, was a key ingredient in the reconstruction of Europe, especially Germany.

Rejecting the West's trading system (including participation in the World Bank, IMF, and Marshall Plan) for itself and its allies, the Soviet Union established its own trading bloc, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.[18] Historically most Eastern European trade had been with the West. But by the 1950s, the Eastern European nations traded primarily within the Soviet bloc (Spulbar 1968; Kaser 1967). Outside its sphere of influence, fire Soviet Union sometimes coerced and sometimes encouraged others to adopt its economic system and centralized economic policies.

Although initially waged in political and economic terms, the Cold War soon took on a military cast as well.[19] The United States and USSR stationed troops around the world, and both sailed fleets on all the planet's oceans. Yet they never confronted one another directly in a hot war and rarely contributed their own forces to the exclusion of regional powers. Rather, they creaced highly militarized clients as both sold weapons that local states could not themselves produce and subsidized weapons purchases their clients could not otherwise afford.[20] These transfers of sophisticated weaponry allowed local states to engage in large"scale modern warfare.[21] One legacy of the Cold War is that a large number of advanced weapons, such as supersonic fighter planes and surface-to-.air missiles, remain in the periphery.[22]

18. By the end of the Cold War, this dual economic system had created relatively more prosperous U.S. allies and relatively more backward, stultified, and stagnant Soviet ones. More important, those linked politically and militarily to the United States were more part of a larger global economy than were Soviet clients.

19. In later years, a dispute emerged about the character of containrnent. George Kennan, widely credited as the doctrine's intellectual parent, protested that his prescription had been inappropriately given a military character (Kennan 1967b). Although the struggle was initially political, the military component was central to foreign- and defense-policy planning (Lefffer 1992).

20. The great powers also helpcd many small powers develop indigenous arms industries Neuman 1984).

21. The number of ranks engaged in the Sinai and Golan during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war was second only to the World War II battle of the Kursk between Germany and Russia. In a single batlle, Egypt deployed nearly 1,000 ranks and Israel 700 (Safran 1981, 305, 331). In all, Egypt and Syria lost more than 2,000 tanks and Israel more than 800; the Arab stares lost some 500 aircraft and Israel lost 114.

22. Regional states have learned to use sophisticated weaponry most effectively. The Mujahideen in Afghanistan used U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles against Soviet fighter planes and helicopters. During the Gulf War, Iraq launched Soviet Scud missiles against both Israel and Saudi

Neither superpower had direct security or economic interests in many of the regions in which it became involved, but *reputation* provided the key externality that linked regions and superpower involvement in them.[23] A superpower committed either to encouraging or to preventing Communist expansion around the world could not afford to be seen as reneging on that promise. The wars in Korea and Vietnam were fought as much for Europe and the Middle East as for any intrinsic interest in either.[24] More than concrete interests, credibility was on the line.

The importance of reputation and credibility underlay the position of hard-line realists who advocated a policy of global anti-Communist containment.[25] They called for an activist U.S. policy worldwide, warning of the dangers of falling dominoes and the damage to American credibility in core regions should the United States fail to defend its commitments in peripheral locales. Not surprisingly, Kennan strongly objected to the notion that the United States had to resist Communism everywhere. He saw no need to contain the Soviets in the Third World, since even substantial Soviet conquests there would not alter the global balance of power.[26]

Moreover, the centrality of reputation derived not from considerations of power as much as ideology. Although a great power's commitments are linked, it can typically distinguish vital from secondary interests and so decouple its commitments and guarantees. But the ideological overlay of the Cold War, by linking reputation through a universal issue other than that of credibility alone, made it extremely difficult to do so. A great power com-

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Arabia. There is, of course, a danger that sophisticated weapons will be used against the supplier or its allies. In 1982, Argentina sunk two British ships with French Exocet missiles, and in 1987, Iraq heavily damaged the U.S. frigate Stark with an Exocet missile.

23. On externalities and spillovers, see Lake, this volume.

24. This point is made by LaFeber (1993). See also Jervis 1980. For a review of a number of works that examine U.S. intervention in the Korean War as a signal to American allies, see McMahon 1988.

25. More recently, the Reagan Doctrine went beyond a strategy of total containment. It called for "rollback," or pushing back, the Soviet position in the Third World (Copson and Cronin 1987).

26. The debate about what parts of the world matter and which should rake primacy predates the Cold War. During the interwar period and immediately after World War II, Europe Firsters and Asia Firsters disputed the proper priorities of U.S. foreign policy. Today's debate questions whether the Third World matters. Walt (1989) and Van Evera (1989) contend that American vital interests have not substantially changed since Kennan identified five strategic regions, although they add access to Persian Gulf oil as a strategic concern. According to Walt's calculation, Western Europe is the largest "prize," producing roughly 22 percent of the gross world product. In contrast, he notes, the entire Third World produces less than 20 percent of gross world product from more than one hundred countries. Africa has an aggregate GNP lower than Britain's.

mitted to the defense of freedom and the containment of Communism could not easily renege on one of its commitments without affecting all of them.[27]

Although the Cold War globalized many regional and local conflicts, regional differentiation remained a salient feature of world politics (Lobell n.d.). Although U.S.-Soviet competition eventually came to encompass the world, the timing and extent of superpower penetration, and the intensity of the rivalry, varied across space and over rime. Europe generally; the Northern Tier States of Greece (Kuniholm 1980; Fawcett 1992; Hess 1974; Stavrianos 1952; Knight 1975), Turkey, and Iran; and the Far East were drawn into the superpower competition early in the Cold War; Africa, the Persian Gulf, and Latin America were drawn in much later or remained on the periphery. Several factors, such as the loss-of-strength gradient (Boulding 1963), the strategic value of a region, and the presence of local states with an ideological affinity for one of the superpowers, contributed to the variation of superpower penetration of regional politics.

According to the standard interpretation, the withdrawal of American and Soviet forces from the Korean peninsula delayed the Cold War's coming to Asia until the Korean War began there in 1950. Our alternative formulation holds instead that the Cold War came to East Asia as early as it did to Europe. The United States and USSR occupied countries they had liberated in both regions in order to create states in their own images. The primary difference between the European and Asian experiences was char ideological and military competition between the superpowers occurred simultaneously in Europe. In Asia, only the ideological competition was manifest during the initial stages of the Cold War; military competition began later (Gallicchio 1988; Iriye 1974).

Africa, the Persian Gulf, and South America remained on the sidelines for most of the Cold War, drawn into the fray much later or not all. Until the Angolan crisis in the mid-1970s, Africa remained largely marginalized, with the United States devolving much of its putative "global" responsibilities there to the former European colonial powers of the region.[28] The super-

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27. The USSR created a hierarchy of socialist states as the basis for signaling their relative importance and differentiating its commitments to them (Wallander 1992; Luttwak 1983; Bialer 1986).

28. Noel (1981) titles his chapter on Africa "'Non-Benign Neglect': The United States and Black Africa in the Twentieth Century," and notes that the United States has historically neglected Africa, pointing out that as lace as 19S8 the United States had more diplomats in West Germany than in all of Africa. See also Laidi 1990 and Jackson 1982. One bibliographic index on the origins of the Cold War has not a single citation on Africa (Black 1986). The United States replaced Britain and France as they retreated from the Middle East but did not do so in Africa .

powers remained aloof from the conflict oner the Western Sahara, with the Americans extending only limited support to Morocco and the Soviets offering no support to the Polisario. In the Persian Gulf, where the United States built the shah's Iran into a regional hegernon, the Soviet Union had no opportunity to establish a toehold until the shah's fall in 1979. South (although not Central) America also remained largely uninvolved in the Cold War. Almost all Soviet arms deliveries to Latin America went to Cuba until after the rise of the Sandinistas in 1979, when Nicaragua also got Soviet munitions.[29]

During the Cold War, each superpower dominated a sphere of influence in which it established and enforced a set of rules of behavior and over which the other was not prepared to challenge its primacy. Beyond each sphere of influence, there were a number of highly penetrated regions. The primary difference between a sphere of influence and a highly penetrated region was that both superpowers refrained from direct intervention in the latter for fear that a local confrontation could escalate into a nuclear exchange. Instead, the United States and the USSR both extended substantial military and economic support to create surrogates, as they did in the Middle and Far East, that could police the regions for them.

The degree of superpower penetration of local politics varied as widely as the timing of their interventions in regional affairs. As measured by arms transfers from the superpowers to their clients, U.S. and Soviet military support (as well as economic assistance) for clients in Africa and Latin America never reached the proportions found in the Middle East.[30] Variation existed not only regionally but over time. American and especially Soviet arms transfers to Africa greatly increased in the mid-1970s, whereas U.S. arms sales to the Middle East peaked during the Reagan years. Finally, the types of weapons delivered to clients varied across regions (ACDA 1979, 159–64; 1985, 135–37; 1988, 137–39; 1994, 145–47). The superpowers delivered

29. From 1984 to 1988, the Soviets delivered more than $9.7 billion worth of weapons to Latin America. Of this, $7.4 billion went to Cuba, $2.1 billion went to Nicaragua, and $.2 billion went to Peru (ACDA 1990, 117).

30. Between 1964 and 1991, the value of U.S. arms transfers to the Middle East was nine times greater than to Latin America and fifteen times greater than to Africa. During the same period, Soviet arms transfers to the Middle East were four times greater than to Latin America and two times greater than to Africa. Oceania (Australia and New Zealand) remained completely outside the superpower rivalry, with the United States transferring a negligible amount ($6.3 billion in arms between 1964 and 1991) and the Soviet Union transferring no arms to the region (ACDA 1975, 67–71; 1985 42–44; 1990, 32–34; 1994, 135–39). Other great powers remained active in the politics of regions to which they had colonial ties. China became increasingly active in East Asia, and France and Britain were active in the Middle East and Africa. Indeed, French arms transfers to Africa often exceeded American deliveries there.

a greater number of arms, and more sophisticated ones, to their clients in the Middle East than to those in Latin America and Africa combined (Neuman 1986).[31]

Although the Cold War internationalized many regional conflicts, this differentiated perspective highlights two characteristics of world politics. First, regions were incorporated into the Cold War rivalry at different rates, some early and some late. Second, the degree of superpower penetration varied across regions, with some at the center of the Cold War rivalry, while others remained on its periphery.

The End of the Cold War: Multiple Dimensions

The end of the Cold War simultaneously represents four analytically distinct phenomena. It signals the relative collapse of a great power. Ir closes an era of global bipolarity. It concludes an ideological struggle of some seven decades. And it ends the existence of the last great multinational empire. Each of these has distinct implications for future world and regional politics.

The USSR has experienced an economic and military collapse of immense proportions. Its core successor, Russia, remains a great power but a substantially weaker one. In itself, such a relative decline would lead to power vacuums, especially within that power's sphere of influence, as well as to international realignments among major and minor powers. The relative decline and retrenchment of British and French power after World War II, for example, led the United States to enlarge its global commitments and brought regional realignments.

The relative collapse of the Soviet Union means not only the loss of a great power but of one pole in a bipolar world. This has !ed some to assert a new era of unipolarity (oh so shortly after an overwhelming emphasis on relative American decline), whereas others who perceive an emergent multi. polarity assume the current international structure will he short-lived.

31. Between 1973 and 1991, the United Scares transferred roughly 270 subsonic fighter planes and 1,180 supersonic fighter planes to the Middle East, 300 subsonic fighters and 100 supersonic fighters to Latin America, and only 6 subsonic fighters and 70 supersonic fighters to Africa (during this same period, Britain and France transferred 135 subsonic fighters and 175 supersonic fighters to Africa). The USSR transferred roughly 400 subsonic and 2,395 supersonic fighters to the Middle East, only 300 subsonic and 100 supersonic fighters to Latin America, and 165 subsonic and 1,515 supersonic fighters to Africa.

The end of bipolarity has had marked effects, including contradictory ones, on the foreign policies of American and Russian client states. In some instances, it has encouraged greater caution and conservatism. For Russian protégés, the collapse of Soviet power, coupled with the USSR's subsequent retreat from its global commitments, has meant that they can no longer rely on the support of a patron superpower to rescue them. The collapse of the Soviet pole has also served to lessen the strategic worth of U.S. clients, and the United States has been less likely to rescue a reckless or besieged ally.[32] Once strategically important U.S. clients can no longer count on unconditional economic and military assistance in wartime and fear that they will be abandoned without warning. Having to bear the full risk of their actions, some regional powers have adopted more cautious foreign policies and have sought to resolve local conflicts short of war.[33] This tendency is reflected, for example, in the recent Israeli-Palestinian Basic Principles Agreement, which was primarily the product of indigenous actors (Pervin, this volume).

Yet the end of the Cold War and the collapse of bipolarity have also created opportunities for aggressive behavior by local states (Ayoob 1991). The decline of the patron's restraining influence and the reduced likelihood of superpower intervention on the part of a besieged client has encouraged some to act more recklessly and behave more aggressively toward their neighbors.[34] One consequence is that their neighbors feel less secure than in the past, contributing to a regional security dilemma and encouraging the proliferation of conventional and nonconventional weapons.

The collapse of the Cold War also brings the end of an ideological struggle. Realists, who emphasize relative military power, treat the history of the twentieth century solely in terms of the rise and decline of powers and changes in the distribution of power. They see ideological differences as either fully irrelevant or merely as by-products of differences in power. For others, however, the Cold War was an ideological struggle between opposing

3-7. Some have argued that the decline of the Soviet threat to the Middle East means that the United States no longer needs Israel as a strategic ally (Barnett 1991; Telhami 1992; Keddie 1992). The end of the Cold War has also reduced Turkey's strategic value as a listening post on the Soviet Union (Cowell 1993, A3). In the Caribbean, the United States recently closed its embassy in Grenada (Holmes 1994, A1).

33, In the insurance industry, this is called moral hazard. The presence or absence of an insurance policy will alter an individual's behavior. An individual with no insurance is likely to behave more cautiously. An individual with insurance, however, is more likely to behave recklessly, since damage will be covered by the insurance company. Deductibles, which force some burden sharing, are a way to decrease the insured's risk taking.

34. At the same time, the presence of massive Soviet or American weapon stockpiles grants further independence from the great powers.

conceptions of political order and legitimacy. Hence, they count the end of the struggle between Communism and capitalism as a defining element of the Cold War's end.[35] The triumph of capitalism, they argue, has left the international and domestic landscape fundamentally changed, a reorientation that entails changes not only in external alignments but in domestic political systems as well.

During the Cold War, both superpowers wanted to install political leaderships linked to them. Political realignments during the Cold War almost always entailed wholesale shifts in the political leadership of client states. The collapse of Soviet ideology has again brought changes in the holders of political power and even in the nature of the political system within most former Soviet clients. The political conflicts that have erupted in parts of the world and within nation-states are not just a product of the collapse of a great power, therefore, but of the collapse of an ideology, resulting in intensified domestic rivalries, internal political transformations, and the search for new mechanisms for political mobilization.[36]

A second consequence of the ideological component of the Soviet Union's demise has been economic. Those parts of the world that find themselves cut off from Soviet financial assistance and economically adrift are now forced to choose between the continued immiserization of self-sufficiency or the internally difficult and wrenching requirements of economic transformation. In contrast, states most closely linked to the United States during the Cold War remain tied to a growing global economy even as the maintenance of continued military ties comes into question.

The collapse of Soviet power has meant not only the collapse of a great power and systemic pole, and not only the loss of an ideological competitor—it has ended the last great multinational empire and resulted in the creation of separate states where there had been just one.[37] In itself, such a splintering of one into many powers would likely generate regional conflicts in the

35. During the period of Soviet decline, some American conservatives debated the Cold War's meaning. Some hailed the dissolution of the Communist Party as constituting the end of the Cold War. Others countered that the struggle had never been ideological and that since as many nuclear weapons were aimed at the United States as before, the Cold War had not yet ended. They awaited more tangible manifestations of a change in the military balance before being willing to close the book on the era.

36. In this sense, the relative decline of Soviet power is much more consequential than the decline of British and French power in an earlier era. For a discussion of the import of these factors, see Stein n.d.

37. Realists have a difficult time explaining the Russian core's peaceful acquiescence in the dismantling of the empire it had dominated.

area previously controlled by the once-unified multinational empire.[38] Combined with the delegitimation of Communism, the result is a local political vacuum likely to generate regional conflicts among new states and outside powers.[39]

The end of the Cold War is simultaneously a collapse of a great power, the end of a bipolarity, the end of all ideological struggle, and the collapse of a multinational empire. These arc analytically distinct changes that have distinctive impacts on the security environment.[40] Making sense of the current international environment requires understanding all of them.

REGIONALIZATION OF SECURITY

Even during the Cold War, the most globally polarized period in world history, regional differentiation remained a salient feature of world politics. Although this suggests a preeminent emphasis on the structural, we have highlighted the continuing importance of the geographical and regional.[41] The end of bipolarity constitutes a changed structural condition for international politics, but also one in which the geographic and regional will become increasingly more important, influencing security relations in the post–Cold War era.

The end of the Cold War means the decline of the globalizing forces of bipolarity and ideology and the growing regionalization of world politics. Concomitant with this trend in world politics is the growing localization of conflict management.[42] Instead of a global concert composed of the great

38. The decline of the Ottoman Empire resulted in several crises between outside powers and among newly independent stares in the region (especially in the Balkans) between 1832 and 1878 and two great wars, the Crimean War and the First World War (Anderson 1966).

39. The end of the Cold War has meant different things to those areas that were part of the Soviet empire and chat, although dominated by it, were politically stable, with indigenous and viable political systems. For a discussion of political stability and the emergence of regional cooperation, see Shumaker 1993 and Weber 1992 and 1997.

40. One way to perceive the difference is to think counterfactually about the consequences of a dramatic decline in American power. Such a decline would have one set of consequences in and of itself. But a decline in American power would have different consequences should it occur in the context of a collapse of U.S. representative institutions.

41. On the impact of geography on politics, see Mackinder 1904 , Kelly 1986, Saul Cohen 1991 and 1994, and Krugman 1991.

42. The end of the Cold War has an economic dimension as well. The Cold War era witnessed a growing commitment to trade among the Western powers and a reduction in protectionism. One explanation for the increasing globalization of trade during the Cold War is that there is a close relationship between economic and military power and a tendency for trade relations to co-vary with security arrangements, Commercial relations often "follow the flag" and reflecct

powers, like that which formed after the Napoleonic Wars, security arrangements in the post–Cold War era will increasingly be local in breadth and scope (Morgan, this volume), and the form and composition of security regimes will vary across regions.[43]

The relative incorporation of a region into the Cold War superpower rivalry will affect regional relations in the post–Cold War world. In regions in which the superpowers were uninvolved, the end of the Cold War will have little effect on regional relations. Disputes like the India-Pakistan conflict, divorced from the Cold War and sustained locally, will continue irrespective of the demise of the Cold War, whereas regions like Oceania (Australia and New Zealand) will remain peaceful. Similarly, regions of low penetration, like Africa, will also remain largely unaffected by the end of the Cold War. The end of the U.S.-Soviet competition for clients will mean that such regions will become ever more marginalized, although France and Britain are likely to continue to participate in African affairs. The primary legacy of the Cold War in such locales is the continued presence of large stockpiles of sophisticated military weapons that will contribute to deadlier and more destructive conflict.

Although the end of bipolarity will somewhat affect areas penetrated by the United States, Cold War inertia means that, for the moment, the United States will remain involved in the politics of areas in which it has historic ties.[44] The call of some policy makers and scholars for the United States

patterns of alignment, resulting in an increase in intra-alliance trade and a decrease in cross-alliance trade (PolIins 1989a, 1989b; Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Mansfield 1993; Gowa 1994; SkåaInes 1993). Rivals are unlikely to trade, for fear that economic gains will be converted into military power. During the Cold War, as alliances became globalized, cross-regional economic links developed among member scares. With the end of the Cold War and the rising importance of regional security arrangements, it remains unclear whether international trade relations will become more global. The implication for stares that become involved in regional security arrangements is that trade will increasingly become local as well. However, for states that continue to participate in extraregional security arrangements, trade is likely to remain global.

43. Here we differ with a number of scholars who anticipate that a new concert of great powers will form (Rosecrance 1992b; Kupchan and Kupchan 1991).

44 . According to Newton's laws of motion (or the first law of physics) "every body continues in its state of rest or in uniform motion in a straight line unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it." Similarly, only regions that were penetrated by the superpowers will be affected by the end of the Cold War. Regions that were not will remain in "uniform motion": those characterized by conflict during the Cold War will remain conflict-ridden, and those characterized by stability will stay peaceful. In contrast, regions that were penetrated by the superpowers might no longer remain in "motion," depending upon the reversibility of the Cold War. The impact of superpower penetration might cause previously unstable regions to become peaceful or previously peaceful regions to become unstable.

to reduce its extensive foreign commitments to fit its capabilities will more likely be answered with respect to penetrated regions no longer deemed of critical strategic value. The U.S. sphere, however, will remain largely unaffected by the end of the Cold War. The United States will continue to be the dominant player in the Western Hemisphere, the regional balancer unilaterally intervening to settle local disputes, as it has done most recently in Haiti.

In contrast, the end of the Cold War will have its greatest impact in regions that were highly penetrated by the Soviet Union. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, as well as its subsequent retreat from its global commitments, Ieaves a large concentration of former Russian clients in its wake—ones whose internal political and economic arrangements and foreign policies are in fIux.[45] Whether cooperation (as reflected by the recent Israeli-Palestinian Basic Principles Agreement and the multilateral peace negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors) or conflict (as seen in Serbia's aggressive nationalism in the Balkans) emerges in such regions remains uncertain.[46] Regional cooperation is most likely to emerge (1) if the collapse of the Soviet Union has discredited Communism, encouraging Soviet clients to adopt political and economic liberalism and integrating them into the global economy, or (2) if the collapse of the Soviet Union sustains caution in the foreign policies of local states.[47] Regional conflict will reign, however, (1) if it encourages Soviet clients to seek autarky or (2) if the end of Soviet dominance brings the reemergence of conflicts that Moscow had suppressed rather than resolved.

Conclusion

The interaction of structural and geographic pressures shaped the pattern of superpower penetration of regional politics during the Cold War. The differentiated nature of superpower penetration in that era will continue to affect regional relations in the post–Cold War world. In regions that were di-

45. In the former Soviet sphere, the emergence of fifteen new states has also created new conflicts, such as border disputes and regional realignments. The process of state building has also been fraught with conflict and instability, which could spill over into neighboring states.

46. A number of scholars maintain that Asia is "ripe for rivalry" (Friedberg 1993-94). For a more optimistic view of the prospects for peace in the Far East, see Shirk, this volume.

47. Solingen's chapter in this volume argues that regional cooperation is most likely to occur among liberalizing states.

vorced from or on the periphery of the Cold War, little change is likely in regional relations, whether peaceful or conflictual. In contrast, regions that were highly penetrated by the superpowers will be most affected by the Cold War's end. There, the prospect for cooperation or conflict will depend on whether superpower intervention in regional politics increased or decreased regional conflict and whether this involvement left a lasting imprint on regional relations. The implication for the post–Cold War order is twofold: regions that were unstable during the Cold War are not necessarily destined to remain unstable, and those that were stable might not remain so.

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Geopolitics and international law The future standing of the law in world politics can only be predicted in variants. Four scenarios for the future of the world political system appear to be the most probable: 1. the strengthening of the hegemony of the USA; 2. chaos; 3. effective multilateralism; 4. parallel worlds. The strengthening of the role of international law is only possible if scenario no. 3 comes to fruition. For small states such as the Czech Republic or Slovakia, this is the only hopeful version for the future. Discover the world's research. 20+ million members. 135+ million publications. Geostrategy, a subfield of geopolitics, is a type of foreign policy guided principally by geographical factors as they inform, constrain, or affect political and military planning. As with all strategies, geostrategy is concerned with matching means to ends—in this case, a country's resources (whether they are limited or extensive) with its geopolitical objectives (which can be local, regional, or global). Strategy is as intertwined with geography as geography is with nationhood, or as Colin S. Gray... Geostructuralism and International Politics. Cold War Ephemeral Lasting. Lid Superpower. Geostructuralism and International Politics 119. area previously controlled by the once-unied multinational empire.38 Com-bined with the delegitimation of Communism, the result is a local political vacuum likely to generate regional conicts among new states and outside powers.39. The end of the Cold War is simultaneously a collapse of a great power, the end of a bipolarity, the end of all ideological struggle, and the collapse of a multinational empire.