

Security Policy Transfer and the Greek Experience

Synopsis of a Research Project

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Scene-setting

Britain and the US have played a central role in shaping the institutions and outlook of the modern Greek state, from its inception in the early 1800s to the establishment of its modern police force and intelligence service between the 1940s and 1960s-70s. From what had been its predominant position in the domestic security regime of Greece, British involvement dropped significantly after World War Two, while US engagement peaked during the period of the Greek junta (1967-74). Thereafter, when democratisation brought the first socialist Greek government into office, relations between Greece and the US in particular were considerably cooled. The Greek government of the 1980s courted the popular vote by wielding a *Tiers Mondialiste* discourse and a confrontational public stance against the traditional security influence exerted by the US in Greece. Regardless of the apparent difficulties of the US-Greek relationship, however, it was in this period that the seeds were sown of more extensive and scarcely less controversial anti-terrorist co-operation between the two states.

Despite the infamous history of politicised policing in Greece, in which the US was known to have been implicated, Greece swiftly became party to the US international Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (the 'ATA') from its inception in the early 1980s. The US clearly had an interest in providing counter-terrorism (CT) assistance to Greece in light of lethal attacks on its personnel by Greek citizens. Since the first such attack in 1975, the following twenty-five years witnessed not a single conviction of a suspect, despite substantial investment on the part of the US in propelling Greek counter-terror efforts. The ATA program blossomed from its modest beginnings in the 1980s to command considerable financial resources in the 1990s. Alongside the growing significance of the co-operation sprouted complaints from both sides: from the US, that co-operation was superficial and that there was a lack of genuine commitment from the Greeks to counter the threat of terrorism; from Greece, that efforts to engender co-operation were too heavy-handed and that trust between the two states was being undermined by (illicit) unilateral (and belatedly bilateral) CT efforts within Greek territory. Notwithstanding the rise of a modernising, pro-Western elite to the fore of Greek politics in the mid-1990s, relations between Greece and the

US reached a new low in the mid- to late-1990s with the intensification and public voicing of these complaints by high-level officials and former officials on both sides.

These conditions were overturned following the murder of British Defence Attaché Stephen Saunders in Athens, and in the face of the oncoming preparations for the Olympic Games (which brought the threat of a fiasco if US and British CT demands were not respected). The mobilisation of effort on the part of the Greeks won some plaudits from the US and UK; Greek political leaders and officials were portrayed as having finally acknowledged the problem and demonstrated serious commitment to dismantling domestic terrorist groups. Nevertheless, at the very point when the good faith and even competency of the Greeks in their CT efforts were being praised (albeit carefully) by the British and Americans, Greek officials and media begrudged the allegedly continuing heavy-handedness of US efforts to induce an effective Greek response to the issue. Indeed, direct and favourable comparisons were made in Greece between the US approach and what was portrayed as the sophisticated, understated and above all 'respectful' similarly aimed efforts of the British.

The Challenge of Research

As might well be imagined, however, the above historical narrative has been informed largely by the comments of those – politicians, officials, journalists – whose expressions on the subject can often betray an effort to construct and limit the reality of the vision they are presenting (in order, one might presume and understand, to further their own specific agendas). Where then does this leave the effort to research and record the topic? And, one might add, if it is such an unstable and sensitive area, why attempt it in the first place?

To start by addressing the latter question, an academic history – recording and assessing the way in which the bilateral relations of Greece with the US and UK has affected its domestic security policy since 1974 – must be an invaluable foundation for those who wish to understand, and perhaps affect, the current relationship. Such literature to date has been scant, even though Greek public discourse is replete with variations of the commonly-voiced critical assumption that Anglo-American influence has continued to be a dominant factor shaping Greek security policy since the end of the Greek military dictatorship (especially with regard to certain issue areas such as organised crime and terrorism).

More generally, few policy areas are as pressing in contemporary international relations as the transfer of approaches to both terrorism and organised crime from states that have more to those who have less developed policies in these areas. Although the demand for policy transfer of best practices and normative shifts amongst officials and law enforcement professionals has grown all the louder globally since September 11th 2001, the extent to which security policy transfer is effective has been a surprisingly understudied, if growing, area of research. Over past decades, amongst expert observers and practitioners, economic, institutional and cultural obstacles have often been flagged as problems commonly encountered during efforts to secure such transfers. Hard pressure, or the use of incentives, have been posited as having different outcomes in terms of recipient acceptance of policy transfer, but these have not yet been studied methodically by comparing different approaches. Here, the case of Greece, within its EU context and alongside its important bilateral

relationships with the UK and the US, offers a valuable insight into what has worked and what has not, and how, when affecting such transfers in the realm of anti-organised crime and counter-terrorism policies. This research project should thus bear fruit of considerable relevance to contemporary and future cases of security norm diffusion taking place elsewhere around the globe.

The difficulty in accessing official documents on these subjects is possibly equalled by the difficulty in gaining interviews, even off-the-record, from those who have or who continue to play a key role in the dissemination and implementation of these policies. Governments, though avowedly firm supporters of evidence-based policies and the scientific legwork required to facilitate them, are wary of the independent researcher and possible security implications of providing the requested information. They are not alone in this respect; most interviewees, of every possible hue (governmental, non-governmental, academic, journalist), appear for these topics reluctant to swallow an interviewee's claim of non-affiliation to any particular 'agency' or state. Even when interviews are secured, it is almost impossible to gain permission to aurally record them (indeed, asking the very question can undermine the fragile sense of trust established at the outset of a meeting), and some interviewees also become less forthcoming in direct proportion to the extent to which the interviewee scribbles down notes. These are the initial, technical problems that frequently inhibit the progress of research. Substantial questions must also be raised as to the value of the interviews themselves, as a method for seeking to discover the means and effectiveness of norm diffusion. Given the sensitivities of research that aims to determine the strength of cognitive sympathy for a policy of State, 'genuine' accounts of the subject's personal attitudes are not only unverifiable but should also be regarded as susceptible to increased instability. Ultimately, interview findings have to be considered as a rough guide to cognitive norm diffusion, but one which nevertheless can be put to use more reliably in informing descriptions of processes (of norm diffusion) external to the individual (how they see it affecting others, how they believe it to have developed, rather than the extent to which they themselves have adopted it and how that may have happened).

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Opening Address The Greek Economy: Performance and Policy Challenges. Lucas D. Papademos. Introduction Ralph C. Bryant, Nicholas C. Garganas and George S. Tavlas. Monetary Regimes and Inflation Performance: The Case of Greece. Nicholas C. Garganas and George S. Tavlas Comment by M. J. Artis 96. Greek Fiscal and Budget Policy and EMU Vassilios G. Manessiotis and Robert D. Reischauer Comment by Vito Tanzi 150. Economic Growth in Greece: Past Performance and Future Prospects. Barry Bosworth and Tryphon Kollintzas Comment by John F. Helliwell 193 Comment by George S. Tavlas and Nicholas G. Zonzilo...Â EU Transfers and Greeceâ€™s Real Exchange Rate: A Naked Eye View. John Spraos Comment by Apostolis Philippopoulos 314. 281. If political stability is preserved in the short term, then Greeceâ€™s economy is projected to grow again and the recovery is expected to strengthen, as investment rebounds and private consumption rises. The labor market is also recovering, though high unemployment remains a challenge.Â Overall, the most central challenge for Greece will be to avoid a sudden new crisis resulting from government instability, economic mismanagement, or a repetition of the uncontrollable refugee and migration inflows experienced in 2015 and 2016. There are numerous open challenges waiting to be addressed before the next parliamentary election (which, barring a sudden decision by the prime minister, are expected to take place in mid-2019). The Greek government of the 1980s courted the popular vote by wielding a Tiers Mondialiste discourse and a confrontational public stance against the traditional security influence exerted by the US in Greece. Regardless of the apparent difficulties of the US-Greek relationship, however, it was in this period that the seeds were sown of more extensive and scarcely less controversial anti-terrorist co-operation between the two states. Â This website uses cookies to improve your experience. Accept Reject Read More. Privacy & Cookies Policy. Close. Necessary Always Enabled. Sending money to Greece and transferring money from Greece is still a simple operation, as there are no restrictions on capital transfers. Greece's money transfer regulations.Â Greece's monetary and regulatory authority. Monetary policy is determined by the European Central Bank (ECB). Greeceâ€™s central bank, the Bank of Greece is responsible for implementing the Eurosystemâ€™s monetary policy in Greece and safeguarding the stability of the Greek financial system.Â The Greek economy has experienced one of the sharpest declines since the onset of the global economic downturn in 2008 and the subsequent Eurozone crisis, with the economy contracting by 29% in 2008-13. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is the organised, agreed foreign policy of the European Union (EU) for mainly security and defence diplomacy and actions. CFSP deals only with a specific part of the EU's external relations, which domains include mainly Trade and Commercial Policy and other areas such as funding to third countries, etc. Decisions require unanimity among member states in the Council of the European Union, but once agreed, certain aspects can be further decided by qualified...