

Terrorism in Chechnya and Kashmir: An Area of Convergence between India and Russia

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Terrorism in Chechnya and Kashmir has become a factor of common concern for Russia and India. While the concern in Russia is only one decade-old, the Indian concern is quite an old one. What is interesting to the viewer of international politics that in both the cases, the similarity lies not only in their ethno-cultural dimension but also in the source and spectrum of terrorism they face. The role of Pakistan in patronizing and promoting terrorism in both the areas is an acknowledged fact and this factor itself has provided stimulus to the leadership of both the countries to take joint actions against terrorism. The central aim of the essay is to focus terrorism in Chechnya and Kashmir and then look at the similarities where policy approaches of both the countries converge. The Central Asian scenario has been taken into account without which the understanding of the Russian problem would be incomplete.

Terrorism in Chechnya and Kashmir

Chechnya has become a turbulent state of the Russian federation since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. The process of disintegration of the Soviet Union had already created a fragile condition in the region. Taking into advantage this fragile character of the federal polity, the Chechen leadership declared independence in November 1991. It refused to sign the Federation Treaty in Moscow on 31 March 1992. But the tiny Chechen state fell victim to lawlessness and disorder. Chaos was raging in Chechen politics with several National Assemblies, each representing a political trend. Looting, arson, robbery and dacoity were the order of the day. In 1993 alone at the Grozny section of the North Caucasian railway 559 persons were raided and about four thousand wagon and containers were robbed either completely or partially. The damage was estimated at 11.5 billion roubles.[1] This lawlessness also led to large-scale migration. According to one report, till 1999, over 200,000 Russians and 600,000 Chechens fled Chechnya, paralyzing normal life there.[2]

The Chechen leader, Dzhokhar Dudayev was highly ambitious bordering impossible. In his book issued in 1993 he made explicitly clear of his dream to set up an all-Caucasian republic covering all Caucasus including Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia[3]. To check this process the Yeltsin government started military operation in Chechnya in September 1994, which ended in a failure because of lack of strategy. After that the process of negotiation followed. As per negotiations in Khasavyurt in 1996, Chechnya was granted a large-scale autonomy. According to President Yeltsin, "If Chechnya were granted independence, it would immediately become a seat of international terrorism flowering thanks to Arab money injections and Chechen would be turned into pseudo Islam... "[4] Russia was also afraid of the spill over effect of secession on

other constituents of the federation. However, despite the sanction of autonomy, the Maskhadov government in Chechnya failed to maintain law and order and the state quickly confirmed its reputation as a lawless society, dominated by clan violence, kidnapping and murder. By 1999, more than 1300 Russians, Dagestanis and Ingush had fallen victim to those forces.[5] The most notorious of these incidents include the murder of six Red Cross workers in Grozny in December 1996, the kidnapping of Camilla Carr and Jon James in July 1997 in Grozny, and the beheading of four British based telecom engineers.[6] In fact Chechnya was turning itself into a “gangsters paradise”. [7]

Russian soft stand towards Chechnya received a rude shock when on 8 August 1999, some 2000 Chechen militants moved into Dagestan from southern Chechnya under the command of Basayev, Khattab and Dagestani Islamic leader Jadji Bhauddin.[8] Their intention was to declare Dagestan, a constituent republic of Russian Federation, and Islamic republic against the will of the Dagestanis.[9] The next day the Russian forces, under the direction of newly appointed Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, began bombing of Chechen guerrilla positions. On 13 August 1999, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov warned Islamic states not to interfere in Chechnya[10] and on 17 August 1999 the Ministry of Defence took control of the war. The new Prime Minister promised to have the rebels out of Dagestan within a fortnight. On 18 August 1999 the Russian air force bombed TV and radio stations in Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi, villages held by the militants. Later Russian artillery strikes against enemy positions in the Botlikh region were increased, leading to withdrawal of militants from Dagestan. In September 1999, especially after a series of terrifying apartment-block bombings in Russian cities including Moscow, Putin ordered the troops to continue into Chechnya, to root out and destroy the rebels. Putin in his interview to “Breakfast with Frost” show on the BBC on 5 March 2000 justified his actions in Chechnya on the ground that even after the grant of large autonomy, “no state formation appeared in the territory in Chechnya. The extremist forces used that vacuum to break up Chechnya into small units. Each such unit was headed by a leader, the so-called field commander, who acted contrary to the constitution and laws, and we got a kind of a mini - Afghanistan.”[11] He narrated the situation how the extremist forces were getting weapons, money and mercenaries from abroad. He further reasoned: “we understood that if we do not strike at the terrorists, their bases in the territory of Chechnya, we will never get rid of the disease and that gangrene.”[12]

The Case of Kashmir

Kashmir became an integral part of India after Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir signed the instrument of accession with the government of India on 26 October 1947. Alan Campbell-Johnson,[13] the personal attaché to Mountbatten, the then Viceroy, and Mehr Chand Mahajan[14], the then Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, corroborated this fact. According to Campbell-Johnson, “the legality of the accession is beyond doubt.”[15] But India had to fight its hostile neighbor, Pakistan four times at the battlefield and a number of times in various international fora including the United Nations on the issue. Pakistan often violated agreements signed by both the countries to maintain peace and tranquility in the region. It violated umpteen times the mutually agreed principles of Simla agreement, 1972 and the Lahore Declaration, 1999. In utter disregard to the principles of Simla Agreement, which committed both the

countries to resolve the issue bilaterally and peacefully, Pakistan launched moves to internationalize the issue and when it realized it could not defeat India by direct fight it started proxy war against India in Kashmir.[16] This Pakistani urge for proxy war saw its acme in 1999 in Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir[17] just after few months of the signing of the Lahore Declaration. Russia was no exception to Pakistan sponsored terrorism. Among the international sponsors of Chechen terrorists, the Moscow News Files listed following organizations from Pakistan: Pakistani-Chechen Friendship Association, Jihad World Front, Jamaat-i-Islami, Safa, Victory Force and six others[18].

It is worth mentioning here that Russian Federation, like India, is not a homogeneous polity. It has 22 republics, some of which have clearly separate ethno-linguistic or religious identities. These are Adygei, Bashkiria, Buryatia, Chechnya, Chuvashia, Dagestan, Gorno-Altai, Ingushetia, Jewish Republic, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karachevo-Cherkees, Karelia, Khakassia, Komi Republic, Mari Republic, Moldovia, North Ossetia, Tatarstan, Tuva, Udmurtia and Yakutia.[19] Six or seven of them have a concentration of Muslim population. India too has concentration of Muslims in different states. The Russian motivation in suppressing the Chechen rebellion is obvious. A separatist victory would herald the disintegration of Russia. Chechen Ingush and Dagestan and such other autonomous republics are also rich in natural resources and losing them means economic instability for Russia. Russia's reaction to the Dudayev regime in Chechnya was also influenced by the evolving trends in the Central Asian republics.

The Central Asian Scenario

The Central Asian scenario remained fragile after the break down of the Soviet Union. This 'soft underbelly' of Russia was highly vulnerable to various extremist forces and terrorist upsurges. After the collapse of the Union, commentators were busy in writing, "how growing support for Islamic fundamentalism could threaten political stability, of possible inter-ethnic clashes between local Russians and Central Asians, of the dire economic consequences that would accompany the end of Moscow's 'hand-outs', of how regional security would be threatened by a Turkish-Persian rivalry for control of the region..."[20] During his visit to Austria, the president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev voiced concern over Islamic fundamentalism in Asia.[21] The President expressed concern over the growing influence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Asian regions of the former USSR, and advocated a search for shared approaches to solve the problem within a CIS framework, primarily between Russia and Kazakhstan.[22]

Maintenance of ethnic peace and economic development were issues of major concern for both Russians and Central Asian States after the Soviet collapse. Russia was worried about the protection of rights and legitimate interests of the ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in the Central Asian region. Out of 25 million Russians that remained in other former Soviet republics after the Soviet collapse, nearly 10 million happened to be in Central Asia. Out of the total 55 million population in Central Asia, the Russian diaspora constituted the second largest ethnic group after the Uzbeks.[23] However, the breakout of civil war in Tajikistan in early months of 1992 and its fallouts upset the balance in the region. According to reports, in the Tajik civil war between the ex-Communist ruling elites and the coalition of Islamic opposition parties, the later was receiving aid and sanctuary in neighboring Afghanistan where various Mujahideen factions

had come to power in April 1992. The Tajik militants were also getting support from Iran and Pakistan.[24]

The ex-Communist ruling elites in all other Central Asian Republics were afraid of the spread of the 'Tajik disease'. While they had come to terms with social and cultural resurgence of Islam, they were opposed to politically ambitious militant fundamentalist Islam. To check the spread of religions fundamentalism and terrorism, an agreement was signed by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in 1992 whereby a 25,000-strong Russian Central Asian force was created to protect the Tajik-Afghan border to keep the militants at bay. Russia deployed its 201st Motorized Rifle Civilian in Tajikistan. The Islamic elements in Tajikistan received a resolute rebuff from these forces and the ex-communists were put back into power. On 29 April 1993 *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* remarked that Russia would defend the Tajik-Afghan border as its own.[25] Russia has its own substantial Muslim population in north Caucasus and the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkirstan, etc. A significant reason for Chechnya's recent instability has been the importation into the republic of non-Russian Islamic militants, some of whom have spent their adult lives fighting Russians in Afghanistan.[26] The most important of these are known as the Wahhabis, a general term given to militants who practice austere form of Islam from Saudi Arabia.[27]

External Patronage

External patronage has made terrorism unmanageable in the world today. The conflicts in Kashmir and Chechnya have persisted largely due to consistent external support, both at the moral and material level, behind the militant movements that otherwise could have been addressed internally without the use force in both the cases. It is the external support which has been primarily responsible for bringing about an element of obstinacy and stubbornness into the leadership of the resistance movements in these two places and for protracting the conflict.

Pakistan's role in promoting and patronizing terrorism in both these cases has been internationally acknowledged. This has become a matter of concern for both India and Russia because while India is situated in direct vicinity of Pakistan, Russia is not far from Pakistani influence, as the Central Asian region that separates Russia from Pakistan is called soft-underbelly of Russia. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has well organized the terrorist infrastructure. It has established three levels of terrorist training camps, imparting different kinds of military training to recruits. Yossef Bondansky, Staff Director to US House of Representatives' Task Force on Terrorism and Conventional Warfare revealed in a 30-minute documentary in 1995 entitled 'Terror Incorporated,' that the camps around Muzaffarabad in Pak-occupied Kashmir train inmates in hit and-run tactics.[28] In another kind of camps under the direct control of ISI, training is given to create havoc in India. The third kind of camps are more sensitive, meant to train terrorists for world-wide operations.

According to a report published in *Punjab Kesari* on 2 August 1996, several special training camps were established in the Chitral region in northwestern Pakistan.[29] Earlier such camps were run in big number in the Khost and Jalalabad regions in Afghanistan. According to the report, later camps were organized in Muzafarrabad, Aliabad, Kahuta, Hazira, Mirpur, Rawalkot, Rawalpindi and in same places in the occupied Kashmir and Pakistan.[30] Among the terrorist

organizations, the Al-Badr II has been meant for trainees from Arab and Bosnia. In these camps lessons imparted are on bomb making, the use of automatic weapons, rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guns. There are religious classes, instructing trainees in the nature of Jihad.[31] As regards the number of military training camps for recruits, by 1992, the ISI was operating 13 permanent, 18 temporary and 8 joint training camps for Kashmiri youth.[32]

Newspapers revealed that in an official secret report submitted to the former Pakistan government of Benazir Bhutto it was admitted that 38 military training camps existed in Pakistan from where trained terrorists were being dispatched regularly to Kashmir, Bosnia, Palestine and some African countries on 'Jihad' campaigns. At the end of 1996, the number of active military training camps has been given as 73 in Pak-occupied Kashmir, 23 on Pakistan territory and 12 in Afghanistan.[33] In 1995 Pakistan-based Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA) claimed credit for having trained, since 1987 more than 4000 militants including Pakistanis, Indians, Arabs and a small number of Americans in making bombs, throwing grenades and firing assault weapons. According to an official Afghan source[34], there were about 8000 members of HUA in 1994 who were supporting the Kashmir struggle. The Pakistani terrorist activities are not limited in Kashmir; they are very well spread to the CIS, an obvious threat to peace and stability in the region. Under the patronage of ISI, informs a Pakistani monthly, *Newsline*,[35] February 1995, Pakistani religious organizations established close contacts with clandestine Islamic movements in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Pakistan's machinations in Chechnya are also guided by religious fundamentalism and terrorist outlook. Engaged in a war of total secession from Moscow, Chechens had been extended various kinds of help and assistance from Pakistan. Citing Russian intelligence reports *Indian Express* disclosed that Pakistani instructions imparted subversive training to Chechen rebels.[36] Russian officers alleged that hundreds of Afghans from refugee camps in Pakistan were recruited to fight the Russian forces in Chechnya. Leaders of Pakistan's Jamaat-i-Islami confirmed, "their volunteers have been fighting alongside Dudayev's forces".[37]

Convergence of Approaches

It is worthwhile to point out that Russian and Indian convergence on various aspects of terrorism is not a new one. It has since been emerging from the beginning of Yeltsin era in Russian politics. This was made explicitly clear during the visit of President Yeltsin to India in January 1993. Casting off Indian apprehension regarding Russia's dismal approach on the Kashmir issue, Yeltsin made clear Russia's unequivocal support of India on the issue. He appreciated India's position and said, "We know how topical are issues of preservation of the ethnic harmony in today's India. Thanks to our own experience we are aware how difficult are the endeavors to achieve this goal." He further added, "Russia and India are, at the same degree, interested in strengthening each other's stability and territorial integrity." [38] Russian position was in tune with India's because it was also facing border problems during the Yeltsin period. The search for a political settlement of the existing situation was one of the most important tasks of Russian foreign policy, in fact a vital problem of all CIS countries. President Yeltsin hosted a meeting with the Central Asian leaders in Moscow in August 1993, to resolve the problems. He was worried about the Tajik 'freedom fighters' who were being trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan, posing grave threat to the stability of Kyrgyzstan.[39] This was also threatening stability in other parts of the Central Asian region. Regarding border dispute, the new foreign

policy guideline of Russia unequivocally supports India's stand on Kashmir because India also believes in "inviolability of borders and territorial integrity of states" as envisaged in Russia's foreign policy guideline of 1993.[40]

Moscow Declaration signed during the visit of Indian Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao to Moscow in June 1994 was one of the milestones in bilateral relationship and in affirming joint stand in protecting the interests of multiethnic states. Both the countries affirmed their stand to check growing menace of religious fundamentalism, separatism and terrorism, which often struck at the unity of pluralistic countries. Both the countries were convinced that "destabilization of relations between ethnic and religious groups, efforts to forcibly replace them, ethnic cleansing and promotion of internal and transborder terrorism, motivated by vested interests which lead to annihilation of all the positive and constructive elements accumulated by mankind during the many thousand years of existence".[41] During his return flight from Moscow on 2 July 1994, Prime Minister Rao declared the Moscow Declaration as "epoch making" as it concentrated on the main problems the world was facing in the post-bloc situation, such as religious exclusivism, political extremism and terrorism springing from these.[42]

Vladimir Putin who succeeded Boris Yeltsin as the president of Russia took a pragmatic and tough stand towards terrorism. This was clearly discerned from his way of tackling the situation in Chechnya, especially when the Chechen militants attacked neighborhood Dagestan. Putin ordered the army to expel the Chechens from Dagestan and then to march to Chechnya to destroy the rebel establishment. Hence his first India visit in October 2000 could be a step further to delineate common approach on terrorism. He agreed with the Indian leadership and rejected "any foreign interference"[43] on resolution of the Kashmir issue. Russian leadership took the same stand on the Chechnya issue. It rejected Chechen leader Dudayev's proposal for the third party mediation on the issue. Kozyrev curtly summed up this attitude of Russian leadership in December 1994 when he commented to the Russian press, "settlement of the Chechen crisis is an internal affair of the Russian Federation. We need no foreign mediations for that".[44] This above comparison between the issues of Kashmir and Chechnya gives ample evidence how both the countries were forging common stand on issues of common concern like terrorism.

During his address to the Indian Parliament on 4 October 2000, President Putin deviated from the prepared text, revealed the information, which was "absolutely true and verified". According to this information, "the same individuals, the same terrorist organizations, extremist organizations, are organizing, in conducting and igniting terrorist acts from Philippines to Kosovo including Kashmir, Afghanistan and Russia's Northern Caucasus."[45] These common problems of "self-determination", terrorism and separatism whether in Chechnya or Kashmir were causes of grave concern for both India and Russia. Hence, among many common goals between the two countries, one important was to wage "decisive fighting against Islamic extremists".[46]

It would be appropriate here to mention that the focus on international terrorism has been manifold especially after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York in September 2001. Both India and Russia could be able to treat the incident as a major security threat and as an opportunity to reshape international politics. In his televised message to the Russian population after the attacks Russian President Vladimir Putin affirmed that "today's events once again underscore the urgency of Russia's proposals to unite the efforts of

international community in the fight against the terror...”[47] Similarly, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in his address to the nation on 14 September 2001, in the wake of the terrorist attacks, affirmed the Indian stand that the international community must come forward to take concerted effort against the “evil”. He proposed for a comprehensive convention against Terrorism under the auspices of the United Nations to fight against terrorism.[48] This growing concern on the part of the US with regard to international terrorism and its wider ramifications led to the emergence of a sort of global consensus against fighting terrorism[49] and, contrary to the previous stand, the US recognition of Chechnya as a part of Russia,[50] and its pressure on Pakistan to take steps to stop cross border terrorism against India.

As the tensions mounted up along the Indo-Pak border aftermath of the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, the Russian Foreign Ministry came with a timely warning for Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism. In its press release, the Ministry expressed deep concern over the tensions, “ the main reason for which is the unending antinational activities of the extremist groups, based on the territory under Pakistani control.”[51] Hence approaches of both the countries to fight terrorism were strikingly similar. In a joint statement on 3 February 2002, both the countries gave the call for a “comprehensive, long-term, multi-dimensional cooperation among the members of the international community to fight against the existence of extensive ties between the Al Qaida and Taliban with terrorist organizations active in other parts of the world, including Chechnya, the Central Asian Republics and the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir.”[52] This Al Qaida played a vicious role in the Chechen conflict. According to Putin’s Presidential Assistant, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, terrorists captured by the Americans in Afghanistan and sent to the Guantanamo military base are testifying to the connection between international terrorism and the situation in Chechnya.[53] The organization called Beneficence Islamic Charity, found under the guidance of Al Qaida, sent in the four months of 2000, 700,000 dollars to the separatists in Chechnya in 19 electronic transfers and money was turned into cash in Tbilisi and Riga.[54]

Moscow Declaration on International terrorism was signed between the two countries when Indian Prime Minister, A. B. Vajpayee visited Moscow in November 2001. The declaration read, among other things, “ in multiethnic and democratic countries such as India and Russian Federation, violent actions being perpetuated under the slogan of self-determination, in reality represents acts of terrorism.”[55] Both the countries agreed to continue effective interaction on Afghanistan, in the framework of the Indo-Russian Joint Working Group on Afghanistan established between the two countries in October 2000 so that the spilling over of the conflict beyond the boundaries of the region could be averted.[56] It can be mentioned here, “ the spread of radical Islam from Afghanistan into the bordering Central Asian countries of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan often referred to as Russia’s ‘Soft under belly’- something Moscow fears, especially as its war against Islamist insurgents in Chechnya continues.”[57]

The siege of the Moscow theatre by Chechen terrorists in October 2002 and their threat to blow up the theatre with hostages if their demand for an immediate roll out of the Russian Army from Chechnya were not met, further confirmed Moscow’s resolution to fight against terrorist onslaught with an iron hand. Rejecting the demands for a political dialogue with the Chechen terrorists, President Putin said, “Osma Bin Laden, Taliban supreme Mullah Omar and their like minded are calling shots in Kashmir, West Asia, Chechnya and elsewhere in the World.”[58] He cautioned that anybody at home or abroad urging for talks with the terrorist leadership in Chechnya would be seen by Kremlin as ‘an accomplice of terrorist.’

The heightened situation of international terrorism provided the base for both the countries to set up a Joint Working Group (JWG) on counter-terrorism during the visit of President Putin to India in December 2002. The aim of JWG was to put an “end to this common threat through preventive and deterrent measures nationally and bilaterally.”[59] This JWG was necessary, as “recent terrorist acts in various parts of India, in Moscow, Bali, Mombassa and elsewhere have shown that terrorism is seeking ever-new targets.” During the visit, President Putin agreed with the Indian position that for the normalization of relations to be successful, it is not only important that Islamabad would cut the ways of infiltration of militants into Kashmir through the control line to the state of Jammu and Kashmir but would also increase its work to liquidate the whole terrorist infrastructure acting in this region.[60]

President Putin endorsed the Indian stand unequivocally when he emphasized that the renewal of peaceful dialogue between India and Pakistan would have any value when both parties adhere to the principles of Simla Agreement of 1972 and the Lahore Declaration of 1999.[61] Among the areas of convergence between India and Russia, the issue of international terrorism has become prominent. Both the countries suffered and are still suffering from its menace. “Why, then, the Kremlin make exorbitant spending and channel tremendous efforts to Chechnya,” while the economy was in a fragile condition, asked, *The White Paper* and it itself replied that, it was hard to foresee the results of secession”.[62] Obviously, both India and Russia were made to be strong allies especially when the issue of secession comes and especially, when both suffer this menace in their territories. Both gain to a large extent when they stand together on the issue and their differences on the issue would likely fasten divisive tendencies not only within their territories but also without.

Russian leadership supported Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s recent initiative to normalize relations with Pakistan. Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov called up his Indian counterpart on 2 May 2003 and expressed his government’s support for all the steps taken by India to achieve political stability in the region.[63] Russia opposed Pakistan’s reported move to rake up the Kashmir issue in the United Nations Security Council. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Yuri F. Fedotov, during his visit to New Delhi told reporters on 6 May 2003 that: “ this issue is not on the agenda of the world body,” and the “ central problem was not Kashmir but that of terrorism and training camps operating in Pakistan”.[64] The statement issued by Russian Foreign Ministry on 17 May 2003, after talks of Indian Foreign Minister Yaswant Sinha with his Russian counterpart Igor Ivanov in Moscow, reaffirmed the Russian stand that, “the full implementation of obligations assumed by Islamabad to stop infiltration of terrorists across line of control into Jammu and Kashmir and destroy all terrorist infrastructure on Pakistan-controlled territory would foster the spirit of cooperation in South Asia”.[65]

Conclusion

From the above analyses we can safely conclude that both India and Russia have come closer on issue areas like Kashmir and Chechnya. This trend of cooperation has witnessed a positive direction since 1993. Before that year, Russian federation was just emerging from the ashes of the crumbled Union, being involved in the quagmire of chaos and disorder. The visit of President Yelstin to India in January 1993 and his unequivocal support of the Indian position on Kashmir, were some of the early endeavors that prepared the ground for both the countries to forge common stand on issues like Chechnya and Kashmir. It was evident that the Russian leadership

drew psychological satisfaction in supporting the Indian stand on Kashmir, as the issue was similar to that of Chechnya. This emerging cooperation assumed a firmer basis, as Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999 and afterwards.

Another important factor, which drew attention of both the countries, was the role of Pakistan in fermenting terrorism, not only in Kashmir or Chechnya or Central Asia but worldwide. It can also be mentioned here that after the upsurge of terrorism worldwide, leaders of various countries have voiced concern over terrorism and talked about international cooperation to tackle it. Hence, the issue of terrorism can be seen in a broad international paradigm. However, it would suffice for the purpose of our present analysis to conclude that Indo-Russian cooperation in tackling terrorism has acquired a positive dimension and it posits the value of mutual cooperation that can be successfully emulated in tackling problems like terrorism, which have assumed wider significance with devastating consequences.

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International terrorism is, of course, one of these threats. The prevention of terrorism also includes the formulation of the so-called "counter-terrorism ideology" that could unite the international community to realize a common goal: combating any terrorist acts and eliminating sources of the spread of extremist ideas. It would be advisable to lay the following key provisions to the basis of "counter-terrorism ideology": 1) The rejection of any extremist ideas. 2) Avoiding the exploitation of religious, cultural and other differences to provoke ethnic hatred. 3) Extensive promotion of tolerance by Academic Journals.

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Semi-arid areas in developing countries continue to depend on rain-fed agriculture which is exacerbated by climate change and poor governance. Despite efforts and investments by governmental and non-governmental organizations to address the issue of food insecurity in the semi-arid areas of Kenya, the problem still persists. The communities have designed themselves to be resource poor whereas they are not.

First, the Kashmir issue was seen through the prism of the Cold War before disintegration of the Soviet Union. Second, the years 1991-92 were not so promising for Indo-Russian relations. Third, the Yeltsin visit to India in 1993 marked the beginning of a new era in Indo-Russian relationship. Finally, Putin undertook a pragmatic approach in handling various issues, whether it was controlling terrorism in Chechnya or drawing parallels between the situations in Kashmir and in Chechnya or rebuilding Russia's image in the international arena. Discover the world's research. 20+ million members. 29 Embassy of India, "Working Document Submitted by India on the Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism", Embassy of India (cited 12 December 2005), available at: {http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Terrorism/draft_convention.htm}. In answer to: "Who commits acts of terrorism in Kashmir?", it provided: "Mostly Islamists from outside Kashmir, affiliated with groups such as Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Some attacks have been linked to local pro-Pakistan and pro-independence groups." 5 Russia's war with Chechnya. 6 Conflicts in the North Caucasus. A study of ethno-political conflict in the caucasus. Svante E. Cornell. London and New York. and the war in Chechnya Patterns of intervention Georgia: from confusion to assertiveness Azerbaijan and Armenia: subtle but effective Caspian oil: a lost round Implications for Eurasian strategy Conclusions: the retreating hegemonic power. 293 294 296 296 297 298 300 303. 305 307 309 312 316 317 320 322 323 324. Recent papers in Security and Peace Studies. Papers. People. Therefore, this study explores if the military expenditure of India and Pakistan are causally associated with each other or the arms race is asymmetric. Using the maximum entropy bootstrapping method and a series of robustness checks, we find that while military expenditure of Pakistan is shaped by the Indian military expenditure, the military expenditure in India is not Pakistan-specific. Terrorism has been perceived by the academic consensus to be a doctrine that is presumed effective of a special form or tactic of fear generating, coercive Political Violence targeting mainly civilians and noncombatants. According to Prof more.