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Viewpoint

“Do as I Say, Not as I Do”—Towards a Pro-Active Exposure of Opposition Failings

by James Spencer

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Introduction

This paper notes human commonalities and observes how and where Information Operations (IO) must be integrated within an over-arching Counter-Insurgency (COIN) or Counter-Terrorism campaign. It continues by examining open source accounts of popular dissatisfaction with Islamist organizations in the wider Middle East, and suggests how this sentiment and theme might be used to compliment, or even sometimes replace, more violent military and security operations.

The Moral Law

While it is fashionable—and politically advantageous—to invoke religious or cultural clashes of civilizations, the fundamental needs of all humanity—Arab or Jew, Muslim or Christian, man or woman—are similar; indeed the commonalities of the human condition form the basis of international law. These commonalities are effective IO opportunities in COIN operations.

Everyone hates a hypocrite. Jesus taught his followers to pray to God to “Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive those who trespass against us,” while the Qur’an says “Would you ask others to be righteous and forget to practice it yourselves?”^[1] There is usually great glee when one who has been unforgiving of his fellow mortals’ trespasses is himself discovered to have feet of clay.

Nowhere is more enthusiasm taken in exposing hypocrisy than in the public arena, where the political corpses of fallen Moral Crusaders litter the path of history—such as the recent cases of Mr. Spitzer, formerly a campaigning crime-buster who resigned as Governor of New York State over his alleged use of a prostitute, and of Pastor Ted Haggard who was forced to do likewise for similar reasons. In both tawdry cases, while the charges were legal, the real offence to the public was the hypocrisy:

“[Governor Spitzer’s] short, arrogant statement simply was not enough, not from the Sheriff of Wall Street, not from the self-appointed Mr. Clean who went to Albany promising a new and better day.”^[2]

and similarly over Pastor Ted:

“I had to expose the hypocrisy. He is in the position of influence of millions of followers, and he's preaching against gay marriage,’ Jones said. “But behind everybody's back doing what he's preached against.”^[3]

On the geo-strategic level, moralizers such as ‘Usama bin Ladin and other Islamists—both from the exhortatory *da'wi* tradition, and from the violent *jihadi* current—have used Western failings, double standards, and hypocrisy to weaken the West’s wider Information Operations campaign—broadly aimed at achieving liberal democracy—and undermine the effectiveness of the West’s counter-terrorist campaign. While Israel is the most frequently cited example of Western double standards, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i recently referred to U.S. torture:

“The president of America officially and openly rejects the anti-torture bill. This is a very important issue. This means that torture must be legalized and that the Americans must be able to freely torture their prisoners and the innocent people who they detain in Iraq, Afghanistan and any part of the world. They are the flag bearers of supporting torture and yet they are talking about human rights.”^[4]

Unconsciously or not, this hypocrisy strikes to the core of one of Sir Robert Thompson’s Five Principles of Counter-Insurgency: “The Government must act in accordance with the law.”^[5] These double standards can be used by both sides as the very effective basis for IO campaigns, linked to strong human and psychological aspects.

Despite having been responsible for the deaths of thousands of Muslims around the globe, ‘Usama bin Ladin has attained a Robin Hood status across the Islamic World, and is seen by many Muslims as attacking the Rich (West & Israel) and defending the Poor (Muslims). Most Western Information Operations (IO), such as the Lincoln Group’s campaign, have tried to “counter the negative use of information by our adversaries” in part by “plant[ing] those fake news articles trumpeting pro-U.S. stories”^[6]—a zero-sum, rather than actively beneficial, practice. The Lincoln Group’s activities seem close to “grey” (non-attributed) psychological operations, which, once disclosed, evince mistrust in the general population, *vide* the recent discussion of foreign Arabic satellite channels on al-Arabiyyah:

“It is said and believed by public opinion that big question marks appeared on stations that are financed by foreign countries even before they were launched and seen by the Arab viewers. Therefore, they have not had any credibility among the average Arabs. If their aim is to form a public opinion or change policies, they will be doomed to failure even before they start.”^[7]

It is far more effective in the long term to report the truth with attribution (“white” psychological-operations), and let people draw their own conclusions. This is scarcely new:

“Because Voice of America transmitted accurate news even when things were going badly for the Allies, the audience believed its reporting when the tide of the war turned. Telling the truth built credibility, the most vital commodity of international broadcasting.”^[8]


Hearts and Minds Campaigns

It is worth discussing briefly two related phrases regularly recited but less often understood: “breaking the Enemy’s will to fight” and “winning the hearts and minds.”

It is generally assumed that breaking the Enemy's will to fight is achieved by focusing extreme violence on the individual at the tactical level, or by indiscriminate violence on the target population at the strategic level. Yet for individuals who do not fear death, it is no deterrent; while for those who do fear death, once such a threat is removed, they are likely to return to their previous behavior if the motivating cause has not been addressed. For civilian populations, despite the theories of Douhet and his ilk, experience from Internal Security to General War demonstrates that indiscriminate violence often exacerbates, rather than solves, the problem. However, as Sun Tzu wrote, "supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting"^[9]—which is where hearts and minds campaigns come in, reconciling the prime political campaign with the subordinate military campaign aims.

The term "Hearts and Minds" was coined by General Sir Gerald Templar, the architect of the Malayan Emergency strategy, who stated: "The answer [to the uprising] lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people."^[10]

Figure 1: Standard Deviation in a Normal Distribution Curve, Annotated



(Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normal_distribution)

According to the theory of Normal Distribution, shown at [Figure 1](#), most of the population (80 percent) do not support a minority Opposition; indeed less than 3 percent of the population actively support the Opposition. Identifying the 0.1 percent of the population which comprise the Activists is liable to be difficult; they are likely to be highly committed to their cause, and given the nature of their 'activity' it will be difficult to identify, isolate and remove them: 20-40 Activist terrorists with about 200 active supporters were able to operate in the Algiers Casbah despite the best efforts of the French 11 PARA Division. The Main Effort, therefore, must be to isolate the Activists from their support base. At this stage, once deserted—even betrayed—by their supporters, Activists may be targeted without becoming martyrs to inspire others.

From COIN Principals, and their desired effect of dislocation, two observations fall out. First, following Phineas T Barnum's dictum that "you cannot fool all of the people all of the time," it will be impossible to get all of the people to actively support the Allied movement's ideals. Secondly, since that is unfeasible, all that is attainable—and necessary—is to move the subject population

(the Active Supporters of the Activists) one phase to the centre: into passive support, thus isolating the Activists. A major means of achieving this is by the negative campaigns so familiar in U.S. domestic politics: exposing corruption and manifesto hypocrisy.

The Love of Money is the Root of All Evil[11]

Citizens of the West live in a mostly secular era. Religious leaders may preach and exhort morally sound behavior, but threats to their followers' immortal souls have less currency than in times gone by. Politicians are, with some exceptions, subject to a degree of political cynicism.[12] In the Middle East, most politicians are likewise looked down upon as self-serving and corrupt—unless one happens to belong to the politician's sub-national grouping, in which case they are altruistic champions. The institutions of civil society—agents of 'deep democracy'—which are widespread in the secular West, are either lacking or weak in the Middle East. In the Occupied Palestinian Territories, for instance, HAMAS did not so much win the 2005 Elections, as FATAH lost them. This was not only a tactical failing, as FATAH fielded a plethora of candidates in most seats so dividing their vote, but also a moral one: HAMAS played on the corruption and cronyism for which FATAH is infamous. The West's decision to continue to work through FATAH has not forced it to go through the root and branch reform customary after such a political decimation. As a result, FATAH's reputation and mentality remains corrupt, while its failure to secure any meaningful results from its negotiations undermines the secular moderation which the West advocates: it is still not a credible alternative to HAMAS:

“ Hamas and Islamic Jihad proved that they are capable of responding to Israel while President Abbas and his Prime Minister Salam Fayyad have failed to remove a single Israeli military roadblock or to freeze the construction of a single settlement.”[13]

While the opinion of, and contempt for, secular politicians is broadly the same as in the West, it is in the sphere of religion that matters are greatly different. Most inhabitants of the Middle East, of all creeds and ethnicities, are more traditional than their Western counterparts. Religious leaders wield significant influence over their followers. Often, this translates into religious leaders' involvement in active politics: in Iran, this concept has been taken to the logical extreme as the *velayet-e faghih* or Rule of the Jurisprudent, while in Sa'udi Arabia, the basis of the government's power has been the 'holy alliance' between the Sa'ud family (the temporal rulers of al-Dir'yah) and Al al-Shaykh—descendants of Muhammad ibn Abdal Wahhab, the founder of 'Wahhabism'.

Yet religious leaders are subject to the same “desires and failings” as their lay fellows. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, part of the reason behind the rise of the Reformists was Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani's alleged “corruption [which] resulted in animosity and hatred by the people towards him and his cabinet, which was very clear in the landslide win by Khatami in 1997.”[14] The sins of the flesh are by no means restricted to Iran. In the recent Pakistani elections, the Awami National Party replaced the Islamists: while an Islamic party, the main element to their manifesto was a Pashtun nationalist one. For the Islamists who swept to power on a wave of anti-American feeling, the ride soon faded on the rocky reality of politics:

“they were not sincere in their efforts to infuse politics with the tenets of Islam, residents say. One perception is that they used politics to get rich. In 2002, ‘they used to go out canvassing on bicycles,’ says Ali Jan, pushing his shopping cart through the aisles of a Peshawar supermarket. ‘Now, they're driving around in Land Cruisers.’ ‘They are hypocrites,’ adds Gul Khan, pausing for tea on the other side of town. To him and others, Monday was a victory for Islam—driving corrupt mullahs from power in favor of a party that truly intends to help the people, it is hoped.”[15]

For many years the International Community has donated vast funds to support the Palestinian people; the limited accountability allegedly saw members of FATAH embezzle funds for personal

use at the expense of their Cause. However the West has proscribed all three wings of HAMAS because of its terrorist wing, the 'Iz al-Din al-Qassim Brigades. By refusing to recognize or deal officially with the political or social wings of HAMAS, the West has removed financial temptation from HAMAS members, and as a result they remain mostly unsullied by corruption. Not only is this an opportunity lost, but the West continues to deal with the reputedly corrupt 'political' wing of FATAH, whose terrorist wing—the proscribed al-'Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades —carries out attacks on Israel. To most Arabs, the qualitative difference between the organizations seems to be ideological—secular versus Islamist—and not an issue of terrorism. The West thus appears hypocritical in its choice of partners—hardly the democracy it claims to support.

Doctrinal Failures

Given the importance which most religions ascribe to “the Word,” and in particular to scriptures, it would be expected that the Opposition's doctrinal failures would be seized upon by the West, yet this has rarely happened. Many of the doctrinal challenges to various Islamist issues come from within Islamism itself, such as al-Muqadisi's criticism of his former student Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, or Dr Abdal Aziz al-Sharif attacking al-Qa'ida's actions, occasioning a recent rebuttal by Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri. Moderate and secular Arabs have also questioned the Islamic principles of Islamists' conduct in discussions of their actions and outrages. An al-Hayat correspondent, Jihad al-Khazin wrote:

“How can a terrorist kill himself, or kill a Muslim, after reading: ‘Nor kill (or destroy) yourselves: for verily Allah hath been to you Most Merciful’ and ‘If a man kills a Believer intentionally, his recompense is Hell, to abide therein (forever)’?”[\[16\]](#)

Similarly, an Egyptian televangelist called Mu'iz Masud

“did what few Arab Muslim scholars do: he declared suicide bombings to be *haram*, scripturally forbidden. This was no ordinary feat, particularly during a week when the Palestinian death toll in Gaza was rising to more than 100 people.”[\[17\]](#)

However, these debates concern *jihadis*—violent extremists. What of a political party —HAMAS— which stood on a *da'wi* Islamic manifesto, but fails to fulfill Qura'nic[\[18\]](#) requirements to protect religious minorities in their midst?

“Gaza, which is controlled by the Islamist group Hamas, is home to 3,500 Christians, mostly Greek Orthodox. A number of Christian and other institutions regarded by Muslim extremists as un-Islamic have been targeted by armed gangs over the past two years in the coastal territory, the *BBC's* Katya Adler in Jerusalem says.”[\[19\]](#)

Yet the eyes of the world are concentrated on the reciprocal exchanges of tactical missiles and air-strikes, rather than the strategic issue of challenging the hypocritical religious bigotry.

In 2005 elections took place in Iraq and in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Both nations saw two of the most transparent, free and fair elections to have taken place in the Middle East. In the Occupied Palestinian Territories, HAMAS won the ballot, while in Iraq voting resulted in the election, and subsequent re-election, of Shi'a Islamist majority governments. Yet so abusive has been the rule of the clerics' and their men-at-arms over the last few years that young Shi'a Iraqis are turning away:

“‘I hate Islam and all the clerics because they limit our freedom every day and their instruction became heavy over us,’ said Sara, a high school student in Basra. ‘Most of the

girls in my high school hate that Islamic people control the authority because they don't deserve to be rulers.'

Atheer, a 19-year-old from a poor, heavily Shiite neighborhood in southern Baghdad, said: 'The religion men are liars. Young people don't believe them. Guys my age are not interested in religion anymore.'"[\[20\]](#)

Sunnis Arabs of all ages have likewise rejected the efforts of the Transnational Jihadis to drag Iraq back into the 7th Century. Much of this has to do with a potential Islamist government threatening entrenched tribal authority and revenue sources, but no little was the Islamists' intolerant attitude towards others:

"they found themselves stranded in neighborhoods that were governed by seventh-century rules. During an interview with a dozen Sunni teenage boys in a Baghdad detention facility on several sticky days in September, several of them expressed relief at being in jail, so they could wear shorts, a form of dress they would have been punished for in their neighborhoods.""[\[21\]](#)

Both Iraq and the Occupied Territories are exceptionally complicated for the Islamists—both occupied nations, with educated, previously secular populations, and demographically significant quantities of non-Muslims. Yet in both locations they have been freely elected, and have had the ability to enforce their beliefs with lethal force—yet are being rejected. Western IO must analyze and harness this rejection, and spread it—truthfully—elsewhere in the region.

Getting the Message Out

It is tempting to try to undermine Islamist rule by sanctions etc, however this merely provides the Islamists with an excuse for their failings—and when Islamists are able to practice 'original Islam' without interference, all will be an earthly paradise. Such meddling just delays the moment when Islamists must confront their reality that Islam is a way of life sent by "God, the Sustainer of the Worlds, the Most Compassionate, the Most Gracious"[\[22\]](#)—and as such is infinitely capable of evolving over the centuries to meet the needs of Muslims. The Islamic Reformation and Enlightenment must come from within Islam itself; external interference delays it.

The West's ability to exhort better behavior in the Middle East has been undermined by politically expedient actions, easily portrayed as such, which run counter to our liberal democratic culture. This has been exploited gleefully by Islamists as hypocrisy, and hostility to Islam. While exhortation should not be abandoned as a soft-power approach, until the West practices what it preaches, it is unlikely to gain much traction—indeed it continues to open up new avenues of IO exploitation for Islamists.

Having a reduced ability to exhort positive behavior, what remains is an option of drawing wider attention to the failings of Islamist etc governments— or as Abu Sa'id al-Khudri narrated

"The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: The best fighting (jihad) in the path of Allah is (to speak) a word of justice to an oppressive ruler.""[\[23\]](#)

Ms Tavernise's excellent article "Violence Leaves Young Iraqis Doubting Clerics"[\[24\]](#) for the *New York Times* was unusual in that it offered "a version . . . in Arabic," which represents a start, yet this requires bilingual literacy, access to the internet, even above the self-selection of someone who takes a liberal American newspaper. The chances of such an article reaching the key readership on its own are slim. It may, however, be possible for translations of relevant articles actively to be offered up for syndication in Middle Eastern newspapers and websites at a heavily

subsidized rate. The problem with such a programmed is that were it federally funded, the temptation for politicians with short term electoral horizons would be to influence the translation, or to have propaganda stories inserted in the information flow, thus contaminating the virtue of the programmed—and virtue is a binary issue. Commercial media outlets have both editorial and readership imperatives, and are thus also unsuitable. One of the few non-partisan organizations, like Soros' Open Society Institute, or the UN's IRIN news, might be prepared to take up the challenge, so long as editorial independence was assured.

Generation-Faithful¶

Skepticism and Anger¶

This is the second in a series of articles examining the lives of youth across the Muslim world at a time of religious revival.¶

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In-Translation¶

A version of this article is available in Arabic.¶

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Despite concerns over the freedom of the Press in most of the Middle East, there is a real thirst for information. Much of the world is watching with approval—and envy—the public display of electoral democracy in the United States:

“The U.S. election appears to be generating more enthusiasm [than the Iranian elections]. Iranian newspapers are full of articles about Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton and John McCain. An Iranian academic said he preferred McCain because Republicans—George W. Bush excluded—have historically been interested in closer ties with Iran.”^[25]

The issue then, is less ‘getting the news out’, and more getting market share. But the high-level U.S. response has been to fund state sponsored TV channel *al-Hurra* (“The Free One”) and Radio *Sawa* (“Together”):

“Yet, according to a recent Zogby poll, only 1% of Arab viewers watch it as their first choice. Al Hurra claims 21.3 million viewers, but it will not publish the Nielsen survey that supposedly supports this figure. The station is rightly regarded by most Arabs as a mouthpiece for the Bush administration.”^[26]

In many ways, the very public spat between the Blair administration and the *BBC* over the so-called Dodgy Dossier^[27] has increased the *BBC*'s reputation for impartiality and editorial independence. *VOA*, *RFE*, *Sawa*, *al-Hurra* have far to go before they inspire such confidence; and without confidence, they are likely to lack an audience.

Lower-level efforts in Afghanistan et al.^[28] have been less "on message" but more successful, although in the absence of local competition. Given that most people subscribe to media outlets which accord to their political beliefs, they are unlikely to change to one that does not. The best solution, therefore, is not to compete fruitlessly, but to go to the market leaders: *al-Jazeera* or *al-Arabiyya*, which already host lively discussions about politics, religion, social issues etc, and regularly discuss *al-Qa'ida* videos, the Abu Ghuraib scandal etc.

There is another advantage in being a guest commentator on an extant TV station—one can debate without having to maintain a constant news flow. As the Israelis discovered during their

2006 attack against Lebanon, Hizballah's use of their satellite station al-Manar enabled them to set the agenda of discussion. Not having to confirm all details before releasing them allowed Hizballah to pre-empt IDF statements, and establish the 'truth' of an event long before it could be confirmed. They thus got inside the IDF IO decision—action cycle, and so were able to drive the discussion. In Iraq and Afghanistan similar agility is necessary:

“Anything that happens with the coalition we put that out because the bad guys have a habit of putting their news out quickly, so we have to be pretty quick on the draw too,” said Hampton. “We aim to have things on air within an hour.”^[29]

Daniel in the Lion's Den

The United States has had some great success with one of its few Arabic speaking diplomats, Alberto Fernandez. While his choice of vocabulary—he is not a native speaker—was unpopular in the White House,^[30] informal feedback in the Middle East was that the effort had been immensely popular, both for what he said, and the fact that he had said it in Arabic. A pool of responsive Arabic-etc. speaking officials, retired officials—such as AMB Khalilzadeh or GEN Abizaid—and mainstream scholars of Islam able to appear on al-Jazeera et al to engage its audience, debate and challenge issues, particularly Islamist ones, just as Senators Clinton, McCain and Obama do for domestic issues, would demonstrate the democratic values which the West champions.

A less famous example is that of Ed Husain, a British Islamist who drew back from the brink. He was invited to Qatar to take part in a televised debate on tackling Islamist Extremism, where “without any censorship, [he] was allowed to say whatever [he] wanted. The audience listened in silence.” The results were impressive:

“The 400-strong audience, with Muslims from as far afield as America and India, turned to their electronic devices to carry or lose the motion: ‘This house believes Muslims are failing to combat extremism.’ We waited. No people wants to admit to collective failure. And yet the audience carried the motion with a massive 70.4 per cent in favor: Muslims are failing to combat extremism.”^[31]

Given the demographics of the region, in which more than half the population is under 30, tends to be more technically orientated, and aspires to a higher standard of living, including political participation, this is IO “Vital Ground” and must be engaged. Direct exposure to such an audience is of incalculable benefit, for the studio discussion is often followed by phone-in periods, offering the chance for active debate with the target audience.

Conclusion

“And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free”

Information Operations, Strategic Communications, Media Operations etc tend to be seen as a tactical tool, useful in changing behavior during a campaign. However, they also have a major role to play as part of the wider geo-political discussion—conditioning the way peoples think, and thus the way they will act. Although less quantifiable, and harder to co-ordinate, they must be an integral part of any grand strategy, to “break the enemy's resistance without fighting.” An early example was the American Universities of Cairo and Beirut, which sought only to educate—in contrast with the imperial British and French—and as such public opinion of the United States in the Middle East was actively high for minimal cost in blood or treasure.

While efforts to depict a positive image throughout the wider Middle East are emasculated by the West's political choices, a campaign directing the cold light of truth on 'Religionist' activities, whether failings of the flesh or of doctrine, will improve the chances that young people in the Middle East will reject the distorted and simplistic alternatives offered to them. Were the West to get its collective house in order, and conduct foreign policy in accordance with its expressed beliefs—removing many of the subject audience's grievances—it would be attractive to many of these people. Instead, the effort must be to engender among active supporters disenchantment with the Activists in order to move the active supporters into sullen passivity, thus breaking the will to fight in the hearts and minds of the civilian population.

About the Author

James Spencer is a retired infantry officer with a background in Middle Eastern studies, who specialized in low intensity warfare. He is Head of Research & Analysis for Arlington Associates, a defense and security company focusing on the Middle East and Africa.

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What should I do before I file an opposition? If you are considering opposing a trade mark application, you should approach the applicant to see if you can reach a resolution to the conflict without the need to resort to legal proceedings. If you file an opposition without first having contacted the applicant and the applicant withdraws the application without defending it, you will not be awarded any costs and you will not recover the cost of filing the opposition. How can I oppose a trade mark application and what does it cost? If you want to oppose the registration of a trade mark then you must file a TM7 Notice of opposition and statement of grounds. If the applicant agrees with anything that the opponent has said in the statement of reasons, he should say so. While the data on strategic planning rates is all over the map, suffice it to say it's high. Below you'll find ten common reasons strategic planning fails. It's likely that the last strategic initiative to fall short in your organization could be attributed to one (or a combination) of these ten causes.

1. History: You have to be mindful of your history when it comes to launching strategic initiatives.
2. People/Culture: Knowing what to do in the abstract is usually the easy part. Knowing what you can do based on the unique skills and mindset of your team is an entirely different matter. Understanding your people, the culture and sub-cultures within your organization, and shared vision/values are essential to developing a plan that stands a chance of success. Failure to do so is a recipe for disaster. Paper open access. Do as I say, not as I do - a systematic literature review on the attitude-behaviour gap towards sustainable consumption of Generation Y. To cite this article: J P Bernardes et al 2018 IOP Conf. Ser. inconsistency between what people say and what they actually do - the so-called attitude-behaviour and intention-behaviour gaps [1-5]. For instance, in a study of the Millennial generation, [4] observed that even though consumers have a very positive attitude towards sustainability and green products, this attitude is not reflected in actual behaviour. That way, it is of true importance, the understanding of consumers and what influences. Do as I say, not as I do: Hypocrites actions never seem to match up with their charming words. They have high expectations for others, but don't seem to follow those standards themselves. Rules apply to others, but they do not apply to me: Hypocrites believe they are above the law both legally and ethically. They feel entitled to behave however they choose but others must be kept in line at all times. Always someone else's fault: Hypocrites believe it's not their fault for lying. To do this, they isolated the section of RNA which codes for the spike protein which is the thing the virus uses as a key to enter cells. They then worked out how to insert this small section of RNA, messenger RNA, into the cell, where it takes over a part of the protein replication mechanisms that sit inside all cells. The first thing to say is that, with something this new, we don't really know. It could be that it is absolutely 100 percent safe. We are told that none of the mRNA can get into the nucleus of the cell, where it could become incorporated into the DNA. I hope so. Could it trigger an immune cascade? I hope not. I know that the researchers will be looking very, very, closely at the novel safety issues that could emerge. If they are not, they damned well should be.