

Knowledge and Reality (102) – Comprehensive Reading List

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Scepticism

Reading

[Descartes, 1984a], *Meditation I*

[Dancy, 1985], ch. 1, 3

[DeRose, 1999]

[Nozick, 1981], pp. 167–78 or

[Audi, 1998], ch. 10.

[Williams, 1978], ch. 2.

[Stroud, 1984], ch. 1.

[Unger, 1971] or [Unger, 1975], ch. 2.

[Dancy, 1988], pp. 21–28.

[Musgrave, 1993], ch. 3.

Essay

What reply does Nozick make to the sceptic? Is it satisfactory?

Your answer should include discussion of at least the following:

1. Is it a condition of my knowing that I am in Oxford that I know that I am not a brain in a vat on Alpha Centauri?
2. If one knows that p and knows that p implies q , does it follow that one knows that q ?
3. Is it a condition of knowing that p , that one should know that one knows that p ?

Knowlege

Reading

[Ayer, 1956], ch. 1.

[Audi, 1998], ch. 8

[Nozick, 1981], pp. 167–78.

[Kim, 1994].

[Pollock, 1986], ch 1.

[Dancy, 1985], chs 2, 3.

[Lehrer, 1990], ch. 1.

[Gettier, 1963].

Essay

Is it possible to state the necessary and sufficient conditions of ‘ S knows that p ’? If it were not, would it necessarily matter? Should the concept of cause feature in an analysis?

Perception

Reading

[Locke, 1964], bk. II, chs. 1–8, 23.

[Hume, 1966], sec. xii, part 1.

[Ayer, 1956], ch. 3.

[Strawson, 1979].

[Robinson, 1994], ch. 1.

[Reid, 1895a], VI 20,21.

[Mackie, 1976], ch. 2.

[Russell, 1959], chs. 1–3.

[Grice and White, 1961].

[Audi, 1998], ch. 1.

Essay

Is it true that we perceive physical objects (if at all) only indirectly, via perceiving sense data? What is the argument from illusion, and does it provide a good reason for believing in sense data?

What role should the concept of cause play in an account of perception? Does the causal theory of perception require the existence of sense data?

Causation

Reading

[Sosa and Tooley, 1993], Introduction.

[Hume, 1966], sec. VII.

[Kim, 1975].

[Mackie, 1974], ch. 2.

[Davidson, 1967a].

[Horwich, 1987], pp. 167–76.

[Lewis, 1975].

[Skyrms, 1975], pp. 85–89, 121–129.

[Cartwright, 1983], Essay 1.

[Blackburn, 1984], ch. 5, § 1,6; ch. 6, § 5,6.

Essay

What is the counterfactual conditional analysis of causal statements? Is such an analysis necessary for science or is a regularity or constant conjunction view adequate?

Induction

Reading

[Hume, 1966], IV part (ii), V part (i)..

[Skyrms, 1975], chs 2 & 3.

[Chalmers, 1982], chs 1 & 2

[Stawson, 1952], pp. 248–263.

[Mackie, 1979].

[Goodman, 1955], ch. III.

[Harman, 1992].

[Russell, 1959], ch. 6.

[Stroud, 1977], pp. 50–67.

Essay

What is the problem of induction? What is the most promising strategy for solving it?

Universals

Reading

[Russell, 1959], chs IX & X.

Also in [Mellor and Oliver, 1997] (chs II & III).

[Quine, 1980], ch. I.

Also in [Mellor and Oliver, 1997] (ch. V),

[Kim and Sosa, 1999] (ch. 1), and

[Linsky, 1952] (ch. 10).

[Putnam, 1969]

[Lewis, 1983].

[Aune, 1986], ch. 3.

[Armstrong, 1992].

[Loux, 1998], chs 1 and 2.

Essay

What are properties? In particular, can we understand them in terms of sets of particulars?

Reference**Reading**

[Devitt and Sterelny, 1987], chs 2, 3, 4, & 5.

[Strawson, 1950a].

[Searle, 1958].

[Kaplan, 1990].

[Russell, 1919].

[Donnellan, 1966].

[Kripke, 1972], lectures I & II (to p. 97).

[Wettstein, 1984].

Essay

How do descriptions refer? Proper names? Demonstratives? Can we give similar accounts for all three?

Truth**Reading**

[Dancy and Sosa, 1992], entry on ‘truth’.

[Austin, 1950].

[Strawson, 1950b].

[Davidson, 1967b].

[Jubien, 1997], ch. 5.

[Aune, 1986], pp. 135–159.

[Dummett, 1959].

[Blackburn, 1984], chs 7 & 8.1–8.2.

[Tarski, 1944].

[Loux, 1998], ch. 4.

Essay

Is the redundancy theory an improvement on the correspondence theory?

Personal Identity**Reading**

[Shoemaker, 1995]

[Locke, 1964], II.xxvii..

[Reid, 1941], III.6.

[Parfit, 1971].

[Nagel, 1986], ch. 3, §§ 3–4.

[Dennett, 1978a]

[Hume, 1978], I.iv.§ 6, appendix.

[Mackie, 1976], ch. 6.

[Williams, 1970].

[Foster, 1991], pp. 238–61.

[Strawson, 1959], ch. 3.

Essay

What is the difference between a ‘psychological criterion of personal identity’ and a ‘physical criterion of personal identity’? Which kind of criterion, if either, is more satisfactory?

Why does Parfit hold that it is survival, not personal identity that matters? Is he right about this?

Modality

Reading

[Kim and Sosa, 1995], Modalities and possible worlds.

[Loux, 1979], Introduction.

[Loux, 1998], ch. 5.

[Plantinga, 1974], chs 1 & 2.

[Lewis, 1973], pp. 84–91.

[Jubien, 1997], ch. 8.

[Armstrong, 1986].

The selection from [Lewis, 1973] is also in [Loux, 1979]. The selection from [Plantinga, 1974] and [Armstrong, 1986] can be found in [Kim and Sosa, 1999].

Essay

What is the possible world account of the semantics of modal notions? What problems are there with this account? Can they be overcome?

Memory

Reading

[Hume, 1978], I.1.3, I.3.5.

[Martin and Deutscher, 1966].

[Parfit, 1971].

[Russell, 1921], ch. 9.

[Holland, 1954]

[Ayer, 1956], ch. 4.

[Edwards, 1967b].

[Locke, 1971], chs. 3, 7, 9.

[Evans, 1982], ch 7 § 5.

[Squires, 1969].

Essay

What is the connection between your present memories of what you did in the past and your past experiences of doing those things?

Could you remember others' experiences?

Do we have any knowledge of the past that isn't based on memory?

Meaning

Reading

[Grice, 1957].

[Strawson, 1971].

[Blackburn, 1984], chs. 2 & 3.

[Wiggins, 1997].

[Travis, 1997].

[Davidson, 1967b].

[Putnam, 1982].

[Fodor and Lepore, 1992].

[Avramides, 1997].

Essay

What are the main alternative accounts of meaning? Which, if any, do you think is most reasonable?

Probability

Reading

- [Skyrms, 1975], chapters 1-3 and 7. [Mackie, 1973], chapter 5.
 [van Fraassen, 1980], chapter 6. [Swinburne, 1971].

Essay

What is the correct interpretation of probabilistic statements in the natural sciences?

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READING COMPREHENSION. Read the text below and answer the questions that follow. What Brings about Changes in Science? (1)

Einstein published three major scientific papers. One of these put forward a new way of calculating the size of molecules. Another explained Brownian motion – the random dance performed by specks of dust trapped in a fluid. Einstein suggested that the tiny particles making up the fluid – its atoms or molecules – were bouncing against the specks of dust and causing the motion. These papers helped to establish the reality of atoms and molecules. Another of Einstein’s 1905 pa... Keywords: background knowledge, reading comprehension, strategy. Journal of English Language Teaching and Linguistics (JELTL). e-ISSN: 2502-6062, p-ISSN: 2503-1848. reading comprehension as the process of using prior knowledge and the cues, provided by the writer to construct a model of the meaning of the text which, hopefully bears some resemblance to the author’s intended meaning. Printing: Linguapress reading resources are printer-ready. No need for PDF. Select your browser’s print icon, or select print from the menu, to print just an article and its word guide. Exercises and teacher notes print on separate pages. Teachers: For more ideas for using reading resources in the classroom see Reading comprehension . Interactive resources: Many articles come with interactive worksheet resources that can be used in class, done on paper, or filled in on screen. Reading texts for intermediate English - CEF levels B1 and B2. A collection of reading resources mostly about life and issues in Britain and the United States, in intermediate level English - with word guides, exercises and classroom activities. Seasonal texts. NEW The tradition of Christmas cards.