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FROM THE OLD POLITICS OF RACE TO THE NEW POLITICS OF CULTURE: PREJUDICE IN TRANSITION

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At the beginning of the 20th Century W.E.B. DuBois, the great African American thinker and leader, predicted that the central problem of the twentieth century was going to be the problem of the color line. DuBois saw the century engulfed by racism, lynching, the white man's burden and what came to be known as apartheid. The 20th century was overwhelmed by refugees on the run from racially and nationalistically instigated conflicts.¹

Now that we are in the twenty-first century, the question has arisen whether the central problem of the twenty-first century was going to be the problem of the culture line. Has a transition occurred between a clash of identities (such as races) to a clash of values (such as cultural norms in conflict)? Are refugees of the 21st century already disproportionately cultural refugees?

Samuel Huntington is not, of course, a latter-day W.E.B. DuBois, but on the eve of the twenty-first century Huntington forecast that the twenty-first century was headed for a clash of civilizations.

He argued that now that the Cold War was over, future conflicts in the world would be less and less between states and ideological blocs and more between civilizations and cultural coalitions.

Huntington launched this debate with his article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, New York, in 1993 – an article which reverberated around the world. He followed this up with a major book on the same subject.²

While another African American distinguished scholar at the University of Chicago, William Julian Wilson, had predicted earlier the declining significance of race,³ as race was increasingly overshadowed by class and economics, Huntington predicted the

rising salience of culture, overshadowing both race and class. Wilson, once a Chicago professor, and an African-American, has since also moved to Harvard.

Worldwide there was evidence in the last years of the twentieth century that the salience of race was on the decline. There was also evidence that the salience of culture was on the rise. However, today this balance varies country by country. South Africa is a less racist society than it was in the 1980s. But the Netherlands and Norway may be more racist now than 20 years ago.

Overt discrimination was ending in Africa and the United States; Black folks have had the vote and influenced outcomes. In the U.S., the House of Representatives has had multiple Black members, but the Senate has had only five Black members in 200 years.⁴

Yet the new Black Senator – Barack Obama – has become a superstar and is widely regarded as a potential President of the United States. Under George W. Bush, the United States has had two Black Secretaries of State in a row – one male, one female.⁵

Old style race-based European colonialism has ended in Africa. Political apartheid has collapsed in South Africa.

Overt racism is on the defensive, in spite of rear guard action in Great Britain, Germany, France, the United States and indeed the law-enforcement system in Norway. At the global level there is more Islamophobia than Negrophobia. But there are a few countries where Negrophobia is increasing rather than diminishing.

Globalization has generated international migration. And these migratory patterns in the short run continue to trigger racist challenges and responses. But over the long haul migration is eroding prejudice based on skin colour and increasing prejudice based

on conflicting values. But in what sense is this rise in culture-conflict threatening to erode Africa's ecumenical spirit?

A major area of the salience of culture is the confrontation between political Islam, on one side, and the American anti-terrorist alliance, on the other.

Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of apartheid, far more Muslims than Blacks have perished in conflicts with white folks. The natural enemy of the white man is now perceived to be less and less a person with a different skin color, and more and more a person with a different religion and values. The salience of culture continues to rise.

Inter-racial wars of Black versus White have almost disappeared. But intercultural and inter-religious wars are raging in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Chechnya, between Israelis and Palestinians – and between Al-Qaeda and its enemies in Africa and the world. On the whole these conflicts are producing cultural refugees – rather than racial asylum-seekers. Africa is caught in the crossfire.

The worst terrorist acts in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years have not been between races, but between civilizations. These include the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and the 2002 suicide bombing of the Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya.

In order to kill 12 Americans, Arab militants killed over 200 Kenyans in the Embassy atrocity in Nairobi. The Kenyans were caught in the crossfire in 1998.⁶ And the number of Kenyans who were killed at the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa was three times the number of Israeli casualties.⁷

In confrontations between antagonistic cultures, many cultural bystanders are often annihilated by default.

The jails of the United States are still full of Black people in disproportionate members.⁸ But Black prisoners have been convicted for violating the civil code and are in jail for such alleged offenses as robbery, rape, murder, assault and drug abuse.⁹

But the overwhelming political prisoners under American jurisdiction are culturally distinct. They are Muslims suspected of terrorist intent – whether the suspicions are validated or not.¹⁰ Many of those come from African members of the Muslim world. Most have never had access to a lawyer, or been told of the evidence against them.

As for extraordinary rendition by which the United States sends terrorist suspects for interrogation in countries with a history of torture, unfortunately many of those receiving countries are in Africa – both north of the Sahara and in the Horn of Africa. African countries inhabited by both Muslims and Christians are reportedly doing America's dirty work. Good relations between Africa's own Christians and Muslims are endangered by the policy of extraordinary rendition.

From Triple Heritage to Globalization

It is not often realized that the globalization of Pan-Africanism has also been, almost unconsciously, a transition from a solidarity based on skin-colour to a new solidarity based on shared cultural experience. The Founders of Pan-Africanism were almost unaware of this remarkable transition. By a strange twist of destiny Pan-Africanism was in the lead from the politics of colour-identity to the politics of the identity of shared cultural experience.

It began with the ultimate contradiction of W.E.B. DuBois. He was a man whose family name was French, whose actual physical appearance was virtually white, but whose allegiance was indisputably African. He was the reverse of William Blake's poem about the African child. For Blake (1757-1827) the child was black, but Oh good Lord, his soul was white. [*The Little Black Boy*]. For W.E.B. DuBois one could proclaim the reverse – that this man was white, but Oh good Lord, his soul was black. In reality DuBois' actual skin-colour defied his real cultural allegiance. What the DuBois paradox taught us was that “Blackness” could be a cultural identity rather than a physical appearance.

Then there was the phenomenon of George Padmore's fascination with Marxism, alongside W.E.B. DuBois' response to historical materialism. Here were two major Pan-African thinkers who were involved in the politics of Black identity, and were at the same time drawn towards the ideas of an ethnic German Jew called Karl Marx. Padmore's most influential book was indeed originally titled Pan-Africanism or Communism: The Coming Struggle in Africa. It was an illustration of a huge ideological ambivalence between the politics of Blackness, on the one hand, and the politics of class, regardless of race, on the other.

On the whole, almost without realizing it, W.E.B. DuBois and George Padmore were products of the Dual Heritage (two converging civilizations). These Pan-Africanists were products of left wing Western civilization, on the one hand, and left wing Pan-Africanism on the other. Without fully realizing it, DuBois and Padmore constituted a transition from the politics of Black identity to the politics of multicultural ideologies.

Then came Kwame Nkrumah. He constituted the next stage of transition from the dual heritage of leftist Westernism and leftist Africanism to the new triple heritage of Africanity, Islam and Western civilization. Kwame Nkrumah called this convergence Consciencism – identifying it as a synthesis of African tradition, Islamic heritage, and what Nkrumah called “Euro-Christian values”.

The concept of “Global Africa” did not emerge until the 1980s. Was this concept first proclaimed in Mazrui’s program 9 of his television series, “*The Africans: A Triple Heritage*”? Mazrui entitled his concluding program “Global Africa.” Mazrui promoted it as a synthesis of three cultures – Africanity, Islam, and Westernism. Was this a prelude to cultural globalization?

The concept of “Africa’s Triple Heritage” came with Mazrui in the 1980s. But the fusion of three civilizations originated with Edward Blyden’s *Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race* in the 19th century. It was then reincorporated in Kwame Nkrumah’s Consciencism, and was consummated in Mazrui’s “*The Africans: A Triple Heritage*.”

Obviously this was a transition from the politics of colour to the politics of culture. Kwame Nkrumah re-confirmed it in his marriage to a white skinned Egyptian woman, Fathiyya. The bride was Arab linguistically, Christian religiously and fair-skinned in colour. Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism had gone multicultural and multiracial.

While W.E.B. DuBois’s forecast of the colour line was indeed vindicated for the twentieth century, there were longer-term prophetic indications of the culture-line which had begun to manifest themselves long before the twenty-first century. Globalization as a planetary phenomenon had been preceded by the globalization of Africa itself.

Death as a Route to Immortality

Another contradiction affecting post-colonial Africa was that it was undergoing both globalization and “retribalization”. Globalization sometimes causes cultural fragmentation, as illustrated by the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. In Africa it has unleashed a number of inter-ethnic civil wars. These are often cultural in nature.

Christians and Muslims believe in a hereafter consisting of Heaven after death. However, traditional African religions tell us that nobody is ever completely dead for as long as his or her blood still flows among the living. This creates a premium for having many children and grandchildren to ensure that one’s blood flows among the living, generation after generation. Such beliefs encouraged Africans to have large families. Thus Nigeria’s first post-colonial Prime Minister, Sir Abu-Bakar Tafawa Balewa, is assured immortality less because he was the first Nigerian Head of Government and more because he fathered about twenty children. However, modern fears of a population explosion are eroding traditional concepts of the value of procreation. Globalization is eroding African concepts of immortality.

But is not premature and violent death also an alternative route to immortality? That may be only partly true with regard to Tafawa Balewa, but it is indisputably true with regard to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. J.F.K. is counted among the greatest of America’s Presidents less because of what he accomplished in less than one term as President and more because of the drama of his violent death in 1963. It is true that Kennedy had great and manifest promise. His immortality has partly depended on the drama of a promise which was brutally cut short in Dallas, Texas.

Post-colonial Africa has produced at least one great poet who was killed in a civil war which was partly characterized as intercultural and inter-religious. It was definitely inter-ethnic. But the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970 was definitely not inter-racial. It was not a product of colour-prejudice to even the remotest degree but this Biafra War was in part a culture conflict.

In October 1967 one of Africa's finest poets in the English language was killed on the front line. The 40th anniversary of his death and 75th anniversary of his birth were celebrated at Harvard University in October 2007.

Is Christopher Okigbo's immortality less because of an extensive bloodline (he left behind one distinguished daughter) and more because, like Kennedy, Okigbo was a case of promise cut-short, of a symphony interrupted? Here is a case of a trade-off. If Okigbo had lived to the age of seventy, and produced only the thin volume of poems we have, he would have been regarded as a good and brilliant poet, but probably not an immortal one. On the other hand, if he had lived to the age of seventy and continued to produce the kind of inspired poetry we had already witnessed, he stood a chance of not only beating Wole Soyinka to Stockholm for the Nobel Prize for Literature, but of being recognized among the immortals of world literature for generations to come.

John Keats told us: "A thing of beauty is a joy forever." Christopher Okigbo's small volume of poetry is indeed a thing of beauty. But would it have remained truly a joy forever without the drama of his premature death? Was this a case of "beauty which only death could enhance"? In reality only history can answer that question.

But some of us wish Christopher Okigbo had lived to write poetry about war. Was he a victim of Nigeria or a victim of warfare in the human experience? Some have

compared Christopher Okigbo's fate to that of Wilfred Owen – who died as a victim of the First World War. World War I was the first case of globalization of warfare. Such a globalized conflict was devastating.

While still at war Wilfred Owen became disenchanted with the brutal inhumanity of it all. Okigbo died early in the Biafran War. If he had died later would he have evolved into an anti-war poet – in the tradition of Wilfred Owen? Would the following lines by Owen have equally described the suffering of Biafran soldiers?

*Bent double, like old beggars under sacks,
knock-kneed, coughing like hags, we cursed
through sludge,
till on the haunting flares we turned our backs,
and towards our distant rest began to trudge.
Men marched asleep. Many had lost their boots,
but limped on, blood-shod. All went lame, all blind;
drunk with fatigue; deaf even to the hoots
of gas-shells dropping softly behind.¹¹*

All too aware that war was often a case of older men sending younger ones to die, Owen reinterpreted the Biblical story of old Abraham on the verge of sacrificing his son to a higher divine cause.

*So Abram rose, and clave the wood, and went
and took the fire with him, and a knife.
And as they sojourned both of them together,
Isaac the first born spoke and said, My father,
behold the preparations, fire and iron,
but where is the lamb for this burnt offering?
Then Abram bound the youth with belts and straps,
and builded parapets and trenches there,
and stretched forth the knife to slay his son:
When lo! An angel called him out of heaven,
saying, lay not thy hand upon the lad,
neither do anything to him. Behold,
a ram caught in the thicket by its horns;
offer the Ram of Pride instead of him.
But the old man would not so, but slew his son¹²*

If Okigbo had survived the Biafra War, would he have become an anti-war poet?

We do not know. But perhaps he was an anti-war poet without realizing it. He did

compose lines which fitted comparable brutal cruelty:

*Death lay in ambush that evening in that island;
voice sought its echo that evening in that island.*

*And the eye lost its light
and light lost its shadow.
For the wind, eternal swifter of dead leaves,
unrolled bandages to the finest swimmer.*

*It was an evening without flesh or skeleton;
an evening with no silver bells to its tale;
without lanterns, an evening without huntings;
and it was an evening without age or memory.*

*For we are talking such common places,
and on the brink of such great events*

*And in the freezing tuberoses of the white
chamber, eyes that had lost their animal
colour, havoc of eyes of incandescent rays;
pinned me, cold, to the marble stretcher
until my eyes lost their blood
and the blood lost its odour,
and the ever lasting fire from the oblong window
forgot the taste of ash in the air's marrow:
anguish and solitude
Smothered, my scattered cry¹³*

Okigbo did not intend these lines to be anti-war, but they are. There are other lines in Okigbo which are prophetic of the cruelty and pain of war!

*When you have finished,
and done up my stitches,
wake me near the altar,
and this poem will be finished¹⁴*

Did Christopher Okigbo really choose to go to war? In reality the Biafran side of the war did not draw any sharp distinction between a volunteer army and the draft. Was

the political atmosphere in Igbo land such that there was a de facto draft for all able-bodied young Igbos? We shall never know for certain whether Okigbo was at heart a volunteer or a de facto draftee. He died before Biafra imposed “conscription”.

The Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970 was not only internally a culture war. Internationally, the war was also a global conflict in miniature. The Soviet Union and Great Britain aided the Federal Government of Nigeria. France and its former Empire in West Africa were leaning towards the separatist Biafra. Israel was on the side of Biafra; Egypt on the side of Federal Nigeria. And the Biafra propaganda portrayed the conflict as a wider cultural chapter in an unfolding conflict between Christianity and Islam on the African continent. Was the Nigerian Civil War a transition from an Africa of anti-colonialism to an Africa of clash of civilizations?

Comparative Apartheid: Cultural and Racial

As we mentioned earlier, the imperial legacy of Europe gave birth to apartheid in South Africa, the most institutionalized form of racism in human history. These were the tensions of identity. But has the new clash of cultures given rise to its own version of apartheid? Are we witnessing the tensions of values? Let us look more closely at normative apartheid, national and global.

Has the risk of South Africa being dominated by White values increased? When South Africa devised the most liberal constitution in the world, it was on its way towards embracing the West through its own civilization.

South Africa has abolished the death penalty long before the United States has done. And South African gays and lesbians have received more civil rights than gays have done in much of the rest of the world.¹⁵ If racism had previously been the ugly face

of Western civilization in South Africa, the open society is now the more attractive legacy of the West.

And now the South African Parliament has passed legislation legalizing same sex civil unions between male homosexuals and between lesbians. South Africa is the first African country to do so – but the fifth in the world, after the Western countries of Belgium, Canada, The Netherlands, and Spain. ¹⁶

The dictatorship of the White man has ended in South Africa, but has the dictatorship of White values triumphed?

In reality, apartheid as a system has moved from South Africa to the global level.¹⁷ At the global level, countries are ranked by development, rather than race. And development is either fostered or inhibited by culture.¹⁸ The rank order of the world is now based less on “who owns what” and more on the new principle of “who knows what”. This latter imperative is the imperative of skill, rather than income. And skills are often culturally relative.

Petro-rich Arabs have much bigger incomes than Israelis. But in one war after another, Arabs have been out-skilled by Israelis. The skills are partly products of culture.

For decades White South Africans dominated millions of Blacks, mainly because Whites out-skilled Blacks. White culture was organizationally more efficient.

In the global system of apartheid, the main economic casualties are still Africans and Black people generally. African peoples have been slow to respond positively to globalization. The politics of identity are still inhibiting black folks.

However, the main military victims of global apartheid are Muslims. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims have been killed in recent years by Westerners in Iraq, Kuwait,

Palestine, Afghanistan and even Libya. There was also a civilian Iranian airliner which was shot down by an American battleship. In the current war in Iraq, civilian fatalities have already reached 600,000, if not three quarters of a million. The politics of cultural differentiation are now more deadly than the politics of racial segregation.

Even Darfur poses the question of whether it is a cultural civil war or a racial one. Both sides of the Darfur conflict are in fact Black and both are Muslim. Ironically, the difference between the two sides is linguistic. The Darfurians are not native speakers of the Arabic language, whereas their tormentors are. Are Darfurian refugees cultural or racial?¹⁹

The North-South civil war in Sudan had been more clearly a racial war at least partially – but that particular conflict has now virtually ended.²⁰ On the other hand, the Darfur civil war is still raging – and the two sides are divided by language and rivalry over resources.

The case of Somalia poses other cultural variations. In the pre-colonial period governance among the Somali was based on rules rather than rulers. This was characterized as ordered anarchy.

Then came colonial rule under the Italians, the British and the French. The Somalis fell under imperial control. On attainment of independence in 1960 the Somali Republic experimented with what was called a “pastoral democracy”. But, although the pastoralists loved liberty and were free-spirited, they were not good in operating a democratic system. The pastoral democracy collapsed and was replaced by an arbitrary military regime. In Siad Barre the Somalis had a ruler, but almost no rules. Military arbitrariness prevailed.

When Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991, the former Italian Somaliland descended into anarchy without the pre-colonial order. Former Italian Somaliland became devoid of both rulers and rules.²¹ But former British Somaliland seceded into a separate country – much more stable internally than former Italian Somaliland, but much less recognized internationally.²²

Then came the Islamic Courts into the anarchic part of greater Somalia. Under the Islamic Courts, Mogadishu, the capital, was gradually finding its way back to its pre-colonial state of rules without rulers. The concept of courts emphasized this distinction of rules and laws instead of Sultans and Emirs. The Islamic Courts were potentially a stabilizing force for the country as a whole. Contrary to American propaganda, those courts were not the equivalent of the Taliban.²³ Nor were the Somali women the equivalent of the more submissive Afghan women. On the contrary, in the 1980s and 1990s Somali women even served in the armed forces – carrying guns and wearing uniforms. This was a very different history from that of Afghan women.

But the Somali Courts have now been destroyed by the proxy war waged by the United States in the Horn of Africa, in a de facto alliance with Ethiopia.²⁴ Conflict between Ethiopians and the Somali people, both within Ethiopia and in Somalia, is not racial but ethno-cultural.²⁵

Conflicts in the Middle East have often spilled over into Eastern Africa. Militarized global apartheid is inevitably inter-continental. The hottest is the conflict between Al-Qaeda and the U.S. allies. Similarly, moral debates in the Western world have often spilled over into Africa. The oldest is the debate about women's rights and female empowerment. Does Al-Qaeda break the code of a just war? Does feminism

break the code of African tradition? Al-Qaeda represents a clash of civilizations; the role of women represents a clash of cultures. Once again, Africa is caught in the crossfire all the way from Mogadishu to Maiduguri, from Cape Town to Port Said.

With regard to Al-Qaeda, one of the issues of debate is whether their kind of warfare is illegitimate. If the United States can unleash a war which has so far cost close to 600,000 Iraqis and still avoid being called a terrorist power, why should non-state actors be pursued as terrorists for killing three thousand lives in the United States?

Part of the issue is whether killers who wear uniforms as representatives of the state have a more solid license to kill than have underground killers like Al-Qaeda and Islamic Jihad?

A related question is whether killing innocent civilians in the vicinity of a suspect is more defensible than killing innocent civilians on the assumption that a number of them are probably collaborators. When the U.S.A. targeted Southern Somali villages for an air raid in January 2007 on the assumption that there were three Al-Qaeda suspects,²⁶ was that really different from Hamas targeting an Israeli bus on the assumption that the bus includes Israeli soldiers out of uniform?

Globalization between Othello and Shylock

Finally, a word about two plays by William Shakespeare – Othello and The Merchant of Venice, both plays set in Venice. It is arguable that there is more anti-Semitism in The Merchant of Venice than color prejudice in Othello.²⁷ On the contrary, Othello as a character emerges as a tragic hero in spite of his marrying a white woman and killing her.²⁸ In the centuries which followed Shakespeare, inter-racial sexual mating became repugnant to mainstream British and Anglo-Saxon culture. It culminated in Jim

Crow and apartheid. Yet in Othello we have a Black man addressed as “My Lord” by a white woman in the bedroom. We see him kissing her after murdering her. Yet the play’s villain is Iago, a scheming white man who succeeded in transforming Othello’s tender love for Desdemona into a murderous jealous rage. This became Shakespeare’s most memorable portrayal of domestic violence. Yet we pity Othello, rather than hating him. And we admire his decisiveness when he kills himself as soon as he discovers his monumental injustice to Desdemona. He says to her dead body:

*I kissed thee ere I killed thee.
No way but this,
Killing myself, to die upon a kiss.*

Before he dies, Othello also calls upon the rest of us:

*When you shall these unlucky deeds relate,
Speak of me as I am. Nothing extenuate.*

*Nor set down ought in malice. Then must you speak,
Of one that loved not wisely, but too well.*

[Act V, Scene II]

Shakespeare even makes Othello more prejudiced against another culture than against another race. Here is a Black man who is not against white people, but against Muslims. In Shakespeare’s day, Islam was almost equated with the Ottoman Empire. The words “Turk” and “Muslim” were almost interchangeable.

The last words uttered by Othello before he stabs himself are essentially Islamophobic. Othello tells us about a man he killed in Aleppo (Syria). He described the victim as a “turbaned Turk”. Othello also knew Muslims were circumcised. He used even the circumcision as a term of Islamophobic abuse:

*...in Aleppo once,
where a malignant and turbaned Turk*

*Beat a Venetian and traduced the state,
I took him by th' throat the circumcised dog
And smote him – thus
[Othello stabs himself.]*

Othello is clearly much more culture conscious than color conscious. The skin of the Turk was probably white, but Othello is more offended by the Turk's culture – turban, circumcision and all. We are back to the Shakespearean rank order of prejudice. We are witnessing culture prejudice in Othello, rather than colour bias.

In contrast to this sympathetic treatment of the Moor of Venice, Othello, Shakespeare is fundamentally unsympathetic to the Jew of Venice called Shylock. He is portrayed stereotypically as a greedy Jewish money-lender constantly worried about ducats rather than dignity. Ducats were the Venetian bottom line in Shakespeare's day.

Shylock is also portrayed as almost literally blood-thirsty as he insists on getting the literal pound of flesh from a fellow human being. Demanding a literal pound of flesh is horrid, but as a crime it is far less horrid than Othello's strangulation of his innocent wife. Yet Othello emerges as, at worst, a foolish but tragic hero – whereas Shylock is obsessed with gruesome greed. Once again, we see in Shakespeare a greater aversion to a man from a different culture (Shylock) than to a man of a different color (Othello).

But does not Shakespeare assign to Shylock great lines of defense of racial and cultural equality? Was Shakespeare ambivalent about the Jew? Was he torn between the apartheid of color and the apartheid of culture?

It is indeed true that one of the great speeches in The Merchant of Venice is Shylock's eloquent assertion that Jews were no less human than Christians. Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania loved that speech when he was translating it into Kiswahili for publication by Oxford University Press in the 1960s:

...I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? – fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as a Christian? If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die?

But Shylock soon disappoints us about his real motives. As Shylock continues, it becomes clear that he is not using a shared humanity as a reason for tolerance, but as a reason for revenge. When wronged by somebody else, a Christian may at least consider turning the other cheek. But Shylock says instead:

And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge? ...If a Christian wrongs a Jew, what should his sufferance be by Christian example? Why revenge! The villainy you teach me, I will execute...²⁹

The conclusion to be drawn regarding Shylock and Othello is that in Shakespeare's era, culture prejudice (such as anti-Semitism) was much stronger than color prejudice (such as Negrophobia). The apartheid of values overshadowed the apartheid of race.

However, in the succeeding centuries the English people and their overseas descendants became more and more averse to Blackness and less and less hostile to Jewishness. Among Anglo-Saxon prejudices, color eventually overshadowed culture decisively for several centuries.

CONCLUSION

Globalization has helped to reduce prejudice based on skin colour. The question which our own twenty-first century now poses is whether at the global level we are returning to a kind of Shakespearean scale of values. Of course, colour racism is still alive and well, but is it losing salience in human behavior? Culture conflict goes back to the Crusades and further back to tribal societies, but are we witnessing a resurgence of

cultural belligerence in human affairs in the wake of globalization and unprecedented intercontinental migratory patterns?

W.E.B. DuBois was right about the vital significance of the color line for the twentieth century. Ironically, he himself was a product of a convergence of cultures. In this twenty-first century, culture is in most countries once again overshadowing color, civilization is overshadowing race – for better or for worse. Is Shylock back as culture-prejudice incarnate? Is this culture-line slowly superceding the colour line as the dominant foundation of inter-group prejudice? The forces of globalization are indeed re-defining clashes of identity in human affairs, for better or for worse.

ENDNOTES

¹ There are more than 20 million asylum seekers, refugees, and others of concern to the UNHCR (over five million of whom are in Africa) according to the UNHCR web site <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/basics/opendoc.htm?tbl=BASICS&id=3b028097c>, as of January 1, 2006 in the world.

² For the relevant article and early responses consult Samuel P. Huntington, et al, "The Clash of Civilizations: The Debate," (New York: Foreign Affairs, 1993). The book-length expansion of Huntington's argument may be found in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

³ Consult William Julius Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race : Blacks and Changing American Institutions* (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1978).

⁴ Blacks who have served (or are serving) as Senators include Hiram Revels and Blanche Bruce (both from Mississippi), Edward Brooke (Massachusetts), Carol Moseley Braun and Barack Obama (both from Illinois).

⁵ General Colin Powell and Condoleeza Rice are among the few prominent black Republicans who have served under both President George H. W. Bush and President George W. Bush.

⁶ Reports lamenting the end of the African "safe haven," may be found in *New African*, 367 (October 1998), pp. 16-17 as also "Now for Africa," *The Economist* (July 5, 2003), p. 9.

⁷ Beth Potter, "No Vacation From Terror's Reach," *U.S. News & World Report*, (December 9, 2002).

⁸ According to the National Urban League's *State of Black America 2007* Report, black men are nearly seven times more likely to be jailed than white men; see "State of Black America," *The Washington Post* (April 21, 2007).

⁹ There is an epidemic of black-on-black violence. A study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, found that almost half the people murdered in the US annually were black; between 2001 and 2005, nine of 10 black murder victims were killed by other blacks; and blacks -- who comprise 13 percent of the population -- were victims in 15 percent of nonfatal violent crimes. For a report, consult Dan Eggen, "Study: Almost Half of Murder Victims Black," *The Washington Post* (August 10, 2007).

¹⁰ For instance, even an insider - Lt. Col. Stephen E. Abraham of the Army Reserve -- who had been involved with the military hearings at Guantanamo to determine if the detainees were "enemy combatants" -- has called some of the evidence at these hearings 'garbage,' in testimony to Congress; see William Glaberson, "Critic and Ex-Boss Testify on Guantánamo Hearings," *The New York Times* (July 27, 2007).

¹¹ Owen, *Dulce et Decorum Est* (1918).

¹² Wilfred Own, *Parable of the Old Man and the Young* (1917).

¹³ Okigbo, Distances, *Collected Poems*, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

¹⁴ Okigbo, *Collected Poems*, op. cit.

¹⁵ South Africa's constitution is the first in the world to protect the rights of homosexuals, as Mark F. Massoud points out in his "The Evolution of Gay Rights in South Africa," *Peace Review* (September 2003), Volume 15, Number 3, p. 301.

¹⁶ Clare Nullis, (Associated Press), "Same-Sex Marriage Law Takes Effect in S. Africa," *The Washington Post* (December 1, 2006).

¹⁷ See Ali A. Mazrui, "Global Apartheid? Race and Religion in the New World Order", chapter commissioned by the Nobel Foundation (Oslo, Norway) in Geir Lundestad and Odd Arne Westad, Eds.,

Beyond the Cold War: New Dimensions in International Relations, (Stockholm: Scandinavian University Press, 1993) pp. 85-98.

¹⁸ For discussions on the linkage between culture and development, see, for instance, Volker Bornschieer, *Culture and Politics in Economic Development* (London ; New York : Routledge, 2005); Vijayendra Rao and Michael Walton, Eds. , *Culture and Public Action* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Lawrence E. Harrison, Samuel P. Huntington, editors *Culture Matters : How Values Shape Human Progress*; and David S. Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations : Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor* (New York : W.W. Norton, 1998).

¹⁹ On the various dimensions of the Darfur conflict, consult Mahmood Mamdani, "The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency," *London Review of Books* (March 8, 2007), Volume 29, Number 5; Julie Flint, "The Arabs are Victims Too," *The Washington Post* (November 19, 2006); Sam Dealey "Misreading The Truth In Sudan," *New York Times* (August 8, 2004); and Scott Anderson, "How Did Darfur Happen?" *New York Times Magazine* (October 17, 2004).

²⁰ Consult Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* (Oxford; Bloomington, IN; and Kampala: James Currey; Indiana University Press; and Fountain Publishers, 2003); and Catherine Jendia, *The Sudanese Civil Conflict, 1969-1985* (New York: Peter Lang, 2002) for recent overviews of the Sudan conflicts. Also see Dunstan M. Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan* (New York and London: Africana Publishing Co, 1981) and M.O. Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict* (New York and London: C. Hurst and Company, 1968).

²¹ An overview of Somalia's history may be found in Maria H. Brons, *Society, security, sovereignty and the state in Somalia: From Statelessness to Statelessness?* (Utrecht : International Books, 2001).

²² Consult, relatedly M. Bradbury, A. Y. Abokor, and H. A. Yusuf, "Somaliland: Choosing Politics Over Violence," *Review of African Political Economy* (September 2003), Volume 30, Number 97, pp. 455-478 and Asteris Huliaras, "The Viability of Somaliland: Internal Constraints and Regional Geopolitics," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* (July 2002), Volume 20, Number 2, pp. 157-182.

²³ See, for instance, the report by Jeffrey Gettleman, "Islamists Calm Somali Capital With Restraint," *New York Times* (September 24, 2006).

²⁴ Mark Mazetti, "U.S. Signals Backing for Ethiopian Incursion Into Somalia," *New York Times* (December 27, 2006).

²⁵ See Stephanie McCrummen, "Ethiopia Finds Itself Ensnared in Somalia," *The Washington Post* (April 27, 2007).

²⁶ A report on the strikes may be found in Michael R. Gordon and Mark Mazetti, "U.S. Used Base in Ethiopia to Hunt Al Qaeda," *New York Times* (February 23, 2007).

²⁷ For discussions of anti-Semitism in Shakespeare's plays, see, for instance, Thomas Cartelli, "Shakespeare's Merchant, Marlowe's Jew: The Problem Of Cultural Difference," *Shakespeare Studies* (1988), Vol. 20, pp 255-260; and Marion D. Perret, "Shakespeare's Jew: Preconception and Performance," *Shakespeare Studies* (1988), Vol. 20, pp. 261-268.

²⁸ Shakespeare's treatment of the racial aspects of Othello is discussed in, for example, J. Adelman, "Iago's Alter Ego: Race as Projection in 'Othello'," *Shakespeare Quarterly* (Summer 1997), Volume 48, Number 2, pp. 125-144, and M. Neill, "Unproper Beds: Race, Adultery and the Hideous in 'Othello'," *Shakespeare Quarterly* (Winter 1989), Volume 40, Number 4, pp. 383-412.

²⁹ *The Merchant of Venice*, Act III, Scene 1.

They tried adding new counter-stereotype information. They told people that over the years the members of the groups changed significantly. They even told one group that they got the names mixed up, and that everything people thought they knew about the groups was completely backward. The best predictor of those White children's level of explicit prejudice toward Black people? The mother's implicit prejudice as measured by the IAT. The older White man who is especially clueless about people who are different from him. The cognitive mechanism is complex (Ernst, Kuhlmann, and Vogel, 2019), but the bottom line is that a distinctive person doing a distinctive thing captures our attention and influences our subsequent thinking.

Russian Politics & Diplomacy

Into section 4. FOREIGN POLICY. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the ODIHR said in a statement on Wednesday that it "will not be able to send observers to the upcoming elections to the Duma due to limitations imposed by Russian Federation authorities on the election observation." "The ability to independently determine the number of observers necessary for us to observe effectively and credibly is essential to all international observation," the statement quoted ODIHR Director Matteo Mecacci as saying. The 8th State Duma elections are scheduled for September 19. The voting will stretch over three days: September 17, 18, and 19. Lichtman, Allan J., Prejudice and the Old Politics: The Presidential Election of 1928 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1979) Google Scholar, the most recent analysis of the 1928 election, stresses the religious issue above all other ethnocultural factors. 4. 4 It is worth noting that in Melville's "The Idea that our every thought and movement was a product not of race, not of instinct, but derived from the society within which an individual was reared, was new and unfamiliar." Stocking observes, incidentally, that it was not Boas but his students who were largely responsible for the elaboration and development of the anthropological concept [of culture] (Stocking, , Race, and Culture, and Evolution, p. 231) Google Scholar. 8.